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Abstract
The Influence of Cognitive Factors on the Relationship Between Accounting Standard
Precision and Aggressive Financial Reporting
Kara E. Dugas
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Rae D. Anderson Professor Jay C. Thibodeau, Ph.D., CPA
Department of Accountancy

The U.S. SEC has formally advocated for the creation of a single set of global
accounting standards. As the SEC considers converging U.S. GAAP with IFRS, there is
heightened interest in how the precision of accounting standard influences the quality of
the financial reporting process. My dissertation consists of three studies that seek to
address how accounting standard precision interacts with different behavioral factors to
influence aggressive financial reporting decisions and auditor judgment.
Paper one presents evidence of a significant interactive effect of standard
precision and preparer incentive horizon. Specifically, we find evidence that when the
incentive horizon is long term, more precise standards are associated with decreased
aggressive financial reporting. This is notable as it shows that the effects of standard
precision are moderated by incentives and that standard precision cannot be fully
understood when studied in isolation. Paper two reports the results of an experiment that
investigates whether decision processing mode (either intuitive or deliberative) and
standard precision impact the decision to report aggressively. While I do not find
evidence that supports an interaction between standard precision and decision processing
mode, I find evidence of two main effects. That is, consistent with prior literature, less
precise accounting standards are associated with less aggressive financial reporting
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decisions. In addition, I also find evidence that intuitive processing is associated with less
aggressive reporting decisions.
Paper three reports the results of an experiment which investigates how the
precision of an accounting standard influences auditor judgment. Opponents of the
transition to IFRS argue that less precise standards threaten audit quality through their
influence on several elements of audit judgment: reduced ability to constrain aggressive
reporting, increased susceptibility to management influence and reduced comparability in
auditor judgment. I find that less precise standards are associated with greater constraint
of aggressive financial reporting. Further, I find no evidence that less precise standards
are associated with greater influence by management or a reduction in comparability.
These findings are important, as they suggest that the SEC’s proposed migration towards
a less precise standard system may not necessarily have consequences for audit quality.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has formally
advocated for the creation of a single set of global accounting standards since the issuance
of their convergence roadmap (SEC 2008). As the SEC considers the potential convergence
of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) with International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), it has a keen interest in monitoring the implementation of two
recently revised accounting standards. The revised standards on revenue recognition and
lease accounting are of particular interest, as they were developed by a joint task force of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB). What makes these revised standards a notable development is
that the two standard setting bodies have traditionally differed in the precision of standards
issued, with the IASB issuing less precise, principles-based standards while the FASB has
historically issued more precise, rules-based standards. As a result, this has renewed
interest in how the precision of accounting standard influences the quality of the external
financial reporting process. My dissertation consists of three studies that seek to address
whether and how accounting standard precision interacts with different behavioral factors
to influence aggressive financial reporting decisions and auditor judgment.
Paper one (co-authored with Jay C. Thibodeau and Jacob M. Rose) examines how
the incentive horizon of financial statement preparers, along with standard precision,
impacts aggressive financial reporting. The extant research on standard precision suggests
that financial statement preparers are less likely to report aggressively when applying less
precise standards due to concerns about increased scrutiny from auditors and regulators. A
second factor which has been shown to relate to aggressive financial reporting is stock1

based compensation. Specifically, restricted forms of stock-based compensation encourage
a long-term incentive horizon, which has been associated with a reduction in aggressive
financial reporting. However, there is no research investigating how these factors might
interact to influence preparers’ decisions to report aggressively. We find evidence of a
significant interactive effect, specifically that when the incentive horizon is long term,
more precise standards are associated with a decrease in aggressive financial reporting.
This finding is notable as it shows that the effects of standard precision are moderated by
incentives and that the market implications of standard precision cannot be fully
understood when such precision is studied in isolation.
Paper two (sole-authored) reports the results of an experiment that investigates
whether decision processing mode (either intuitive or deliberative) and standard precision
impact the decision to report aggressively. While psychology research has long supported
the use of deliberative processing for optimal decision making, recent studies reveal that
decision making under deliberative processing may lead to a focus on only the most salient
decision factors, potentially resulting in suboptimal decision making. In contrast, intuitive
processing relies on a holistic approach that makes use of all available information and has
been shown to result in both optimal and more ethical decision making. However, there is
no research investigating whether and how these factors might interact to influence
aggressive financial reporting. While I do not find evidence that supports an interaction
between standard precision and decision processing mode, I find evidence of two main
effects. That is, consistent with prior literature, less precise accounting standards are
associated with less aggressive financial reporting decisions. In addition, I also find
evidence that intuitive processing is associated with less aggressive financial reporting
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decisions. This finding is interesting, as accounting tasks often require computation and
careful analysis which have been presumed to require the use of deliberative processing.
The results suggest that intuitive processing throughout the financial reporting process may
be effective at reducing aggressive financial reporting. Future research is needed to explore
how to best stimulate intuitive processing during the financial reporting process.
Paper three (sole-authored) reports the results of an experiment which investigates
how the precision of an accounting standard influences auditor judgment. In comment
letters to the SEC in response to the Global Accounting Standards roadmap (SEC 2010),
opponents of the transition to a single set of global accounting standards argue that less
precise standards present a threat to audit quality through their influence on several key
elements of audit judgment: (1) a reduction in the ability to constrain aggressive reporting,
(2) an increase in management’s ability to influence the audit process and (3) a reduction
in the comparability of auditor judgments across audit firms. This paper investigates
whether the precision of an accounting standard influences these elements of staff auditor
judgment. I find evidence that less precise standards are associated with greater constraint
of aggressive financial reporting. Further, I find no evidence that less precise standards are
associated with greater influence by management or a reduction in comparability. Taken
together, these findings have important implications for policy makers, as they suggest that
the SEC’s proposed migration towards a less precise standard system may not necessarily
have consequences for audit quality.

3

PART 1 –
Standard Precision and Aggressive Financial Reporting: The Influence of Incentive
Horizon
I.

INTRODUCTION

Proponents of rules-based standards suggest that greater standard precision
improves comparability between companies by providing bright-line tests and thresholds
that reduce the need for judgment in the application of standards (Schipper 2003;
Shortridge and Myring 2004; McCarthy and McCarthy 2014). Reductions in the amount
of judgment needed to apply standards are expected to decrease opportunities to manage
earnings (Wüstemann and Wüstemann 2010). However, existing empirical evidence does
not support this point of view. Instead, managers tend to structure transactions in a way
that requires the use of accounting treatments that are consistent with their personal
incentives rather than the true economic substance of the transaction (Imhoff and Thomas
1998). In addition, financial statement preparers are inclined to report more aggressively
under more precise standards relative to less precise standards (Agoglia, Doupnik &
Tsakumis 2011). Importantly, prior research that has provided evidence in support of more
aggressive financial reporting under more precise standards involved the decisions of
financial statement preparers who faced short-term incentives only. The purpose of this
study is to investigate whether the incentive horizon (i.e., whether incentives emphasize
short-term or long-term firm goals) will influence the effects of standard precision on
aggressive financial reporting.
The choice of whether employee incentive structure encourages short-term
profitability or long-term growth is an important decision for top management. Indeed, for
compensation to properly motivate employees to work towards achieving firm strategic
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objectives, the incentive structure should align with the strategic focus of top management
(Schuler and MacMillan 1984; Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1990). For example, short-term
oriented incentives (such as unrestricted stock or stock options) may incentivize employees
to prioritize short-term profitability, potentially at the expense of long-term growth
(Dechow and Sloan 1991; Narayanan 1996; Antia, Pantzalis & Park 2010) and may even
encourage aggressive financial reporting. In contrast, restricted forms of compensation
(e.g. stock grants and options with vesting requirements) may extend the incentive horizon
of management, which could result in less myopic behavior (Chava and Purnanandam
2010; Bebchuk and Fried 2010), and may even discourage aggressive financial reporting
(Johnson, Ryan & Tian 2009). In effect, the selection of incentive structure may be viewed
as an important signal of the preferences and objectives of top management. And, since
chief financial officers often choose to engage in aggressive financial reporting due to
pressure from top management (Feng et al. 2011), we expect that any signal of top
management’s preferences may influence a financial statement preparer’s decision to
engage in aggressive financial reporting.
In this study, we examine the effect of incentive horizon and standard precision on
financial statement preparers’ decision to report aggressively. Specifically, we extend the
Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) study by investigating the effect of incentive
horizon on a financial statement preparer’s decisions to report aggressively. We expect that
when incentive horizon is short-term, financial statement preparers applying less precise
standards will be less likely to make an aggressive financial reporting decision relative to
those applying more precise standards. When the incentive horizon is long-term, which
may be considered a signal that top management prefers long-term growth, we expect that

5

financial statement preparers would choose to report more conservatively. Moreover,
given the transparency and relative lack of professional judgment required to apply a rulesbased standard, we expect that financial statement preparers applying more precise
accounting standards will report less aggressively relative to those applying a less precise
accounting standard.
To accomplish our objectives, we conduct a 2 x 2 between-participant experiment
with 147 experienced financial statement preparers, over half of whom are Chief Financial
Officers. Participants complete a lease classification case where we manipulate standard
precision (more precise or less precise) and the time horizon of incentives (short-term or
long-term). We find a significant interaction between standard precision and time horizon
of incentives on a financial statement preparer’s decision to report aggressively. More
specifically, our results show that when the time horizon of incentives focuses financial
statement preparers on long-term goals, a more precise, rules-based standard regime results
in less aggressive financial reporting decisions.
This study makes several contributions. Prior research on standard precision
suggests that less precise standards (i.e., principles-based) better constrain aggressive
financial reporting by preparers as compared to more precise standards (i.e., rules-based).
Our findings reveal an important interactive effect when considering the time horizon of
top management’s incentive structure. Specifically, when the incentive structure
emphasizes short-term performance, consistent with prior literature, we find that less
precise standards are associated with less aggressive financial reporting by preparers.
However, when the incentive structure emphasizes long-term performance, we find that
more precise standards are associated with more aggressive financial reporting by
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preparers. This result has important implications. Namely, it suggests that the effects of
standard precision on aggressive financial reporting cannot be fully understood without
first considering the time horizon of the preparer’s incentive structure. Relatedly, our
findings also suggest that further migration of financial reporting standards towards a less
precise regime may not be as effective as previously thought at reducing aggressive
financial reporting. This finding is particularly important as U.S. policy makers
contemplate the migration of even more U.S. GAAP standards towards convergence with
less precise International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides background
information and develops our hypotheses. Sections III describes the experiment used to test
our hypotheses. Section IV provides our experimental results, and Section V discusses our
conclusions, implications, and limitations of our research, and suggestions for future
research.

II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Standard Precision
In May 2014, a joint task force of the FASB and IASB released an updated standard
on revenue recognition which aims to address the fundamental differences between
revenue recognition standards originally promulgated as U.S. GAAP or IFRS.1 The newly
issued standard replaces the transaction- and industry-specific guidelines of the previous
revenue recognition U.S. GAAP standard with a more principles-based approach. In

1

In August, 2015, the FASB issued Accounting Standards Update (ASU) No. 2015-14, Revenue From
Contracts With Customers (Topic 606): Deferral of the Effective Date, which delayed the effective date of
the standard by one year.
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general, U.S. GAAP is primarily comprised of rules-based standards, which provide more
precise guidance for preparers. In contrast, IFRS is primarily comprised of principles-based
standards, which provide less precise guidance for preparers and are designed to allow a
greater degree of judgment in determining the accounting treatment which best represents
the underlying economic reality of the transaction.
Advocates for rules-based standards maintain that the precise guidance offered by
rules-based standards provides a common knowledge base and set of assumptions on which
to base reporting decisions (Schipper 2003; Shortridge and Myring 2004; McCarthy and
McCarthy 2014). The precise criteria of rules-based standards are intended to remove
judgment from the classification process and improve comparability between firms
(Shortridge and Myring 2004). Further, it is generally believed that adherence to rulesbased standards helps to shield financial statement preparers from criticism for aggressive
financial reporting decisions (Benston, Bromwich & Wagenhofer 2006). Yet, it is also
possible that the bright-line rules and thresholds which characterize rules-based standards
may encourage opportunistic transaction structuring designed to circumvent the true spirit
of the standard.2 Further, dissimilar transactions which may be forced into the same
accounting treatment may, in fact, threaten comparability across organizations (McCarthy
and McCarthy 2014).
Advocates for principles-based standards believe that less precise standards allow
recorded transactions to reflect their true economic substance, which ultimately leads to

2
For example, Imhoff and Thomas (1988) document a significant decline in capital leases and
corresponding increase in operating leases by companies that were previously capital-lease intensive
following the release of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)’s Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 13 Accounting for Leases. This standard required capital leases to be
treated as assets and debt, which moved the disclosure of such from the footnotes to the balance sheet.
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greater understandability of financial statements (Shortridge and Myring 2004; McCarthy
and McCarthy 2014). However, a perceived weakness of principles-based standards is that
financial statement preparers may not apply such standards consistently, as there is a
greater degree of interpretation and judgment involved in determining the appropriate
accounting treatment (McCarthy and McCarthy 2014). Additionally, incentives may be
present that influence the behavior of financial statement preparers (Nelson 2003;
Wüstemann & Wüstemann 2010) because the opportunity to select preferential accounting
treatments may be greater under principles-based standards (McCarthy and McCarthy
2014).
In that spirit, several studies on accounting standard precision examine factors
which affect reporting decisions made by financial statement preparers. Agoglia, Doupnik
and Tsakumis (2011) use a case in which participants are asked to determine the
appropriate classification of a lease. They find that participants applying a principles-based
standard are significantly less likely to report aggressively than those applying a rulesbased standard.
Peytcheva (2017) uses a task that has frequently been employed in the psychology
literature to examine the role of standard precision and ambiguity of evidence. The task,
developed by Jastrow (1899; 1900), asks participants to classify the subject of a photograph
as either a duck or a rabbit, and offers economic incentives which favor classifying the
animal as a rabbit. The study operationalizes the standard precision construct by providing
either rules-based or principles-based guidelines for classification. The study also
manipulates the frame and magnification of the photograph to operationalize the ambiguity
of evidence. The study finds that there is no difference between participants classifying the
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photograph consistent with their economic incentives (i.e. as a rabbit) under principlesbased standards and rules-based standards when the evidence is relatively clear. However,
when evidence is more ambiguous, principles-based standards are associated with fewer
participants classifying the photograph consistent with their incentives.
Psaros and Trotman (2004) examine the effect of incentives on a manager’s
decision to report aggressively. They use a case in which participants are asked to
determine whether or not consolidation of financial statements are necessary, and
manipulate whether incentives exist that favor not consolidating the financial statements.
They find that marginally more participants elect not to consolidate the financial statements
when presented with rules-based standards. This suggests that financial statement preparers
are more likely to report more aggressively, and report in a manner that is consistent with
their own personal incentives, under rules-based standards.
Financial Incentive Structure
The agency problem is a conflict of interest that exists in a relationship when one
party is expected to act in another party’s best interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Within
financial accounting, the agency problem often presents as a conflict of interest between
company management and the shareholders of the firm. Managerial ownership is viewed
as one potential solution to the long-standing agency problem. Specifically, if management
has an ownership stake in the company, their interests align much more closely with that
of investors in the company (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988).
However, as the proportion of management’s wealth which is tied to company performance
via stock-based compensation increased considerably in the 1990’s, stock-based
compensation also shouldered the blame for many high-profile accounting frauds. That is,
10

stock-based compensation may provide a strong incentive to improve reported financial
results, leading some to resort to fraudulent financial reporting (Bebchuck and Fried 2003).
This view is supported by studies which find that stock-based compensation is positively
associated with management’s likelihood to engage in earnings management behavior
(Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006).
Cheng and Warfield (2005) investigate the relationship between management
equity incentives and earnings management. They find that managers with high equity
incentives are more likely to report earnings that just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and
are less likely to report negative earnings surprises. They also find that when management
has consistently high equity incentives from stock-based compensation, management is
less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find
that executives choose financial policies based on risk-seeking incentives provided by
stock-based compensation. Taken together, these findings suggest that stock-based
compensation provides an incentive for management to act in a self-interested manner.
Interestingly, Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2006) investigate whether equity
incentives differ between fraud firms and a matched pair of firms without detected
fraudulent activity, finding that there is no significant association between fraud and equity
incentives, nor the sale of stock or exercise of options during the period of the alleged
fraud. It is important to note that these three studies examine different constructs: proxies
for earnings management (Cheng and Warfield 2005), risk-seeking financial policies
(Chava and Purnanandam 2010), and SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
containing the keyword “fraud” (Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew 2006). While these
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constructs are fundamentally different, each measures an action that is motivated by selfinterest rather than the overall best interests of the larger group of remaining shareholders.
The findings that stock-based compensation may, in fact, encourage self-interested
behavior may be due to a phenomenon referred to as management short-termism.
Marginson and McAuley (2008) define management short-termism as a preference for
actions in the near term that have detrimental consequences for the long-term. Specifically,
managers may prioritize their own financial interests by focusing on short-term results at
the expense of long-term growth and profitability, which may be more optimal for the firm
and shareholders (Dechow and Sloan 1991; Narayanan 1996; Antia, Pantzalis & Park
2010).3

To address the problem of management short-termism, Bebchuck and Fried

(2010) propose a series of restrictions on stock-based compensation, such as vesting
restrictions and unwinding limitations that, if adopted, would extend the time horizon of
management incentives.
Johnson, Ryan & Tian (2009) examine the relationship between the type of equity
incentive and the occurrence of corporate fraud. They find that executives of fraud firms
have a greater percentage of compensation in the form of unrestricted stockholdings
relative to executives at non-fraud firms, and that unrestricted stockholdings are the largest
incentive source relative to other forms of compensation. As discussed previously,
unrestricted stockholdings may shorten the incentive horizon of management. Gopalan et
al. (2014) examine the impact of pay duration, finding that shorter CEO pay duration
(based on the vesting schedule of restricted stock grants and options) is associated with
greater incentive to manipulate short-term performance, whereas longer CEO pay duration

3

It should be noted that this concept differs from myopia, which is difficulty assessing long-term
consequences (Strotz 1956).

12

is associated with a lesser extent of income-increasing accruals. These findings may be
attributable to the incentive horizon of the CEO, as pay duration represents a financial
incentive which impacts the incentive horizon of management.
Taken together, these studies suggest that stock-based compensation without any
restrictions on the sale of stock grants or exercise of options may encourage management
short-termism by providing a financial incentive based on short-term performance. This
behavior may not be consistent with the long-term best interest of the company or its
shareholders. However, vesting periods and stock holding requirements can be effective at
reducing management short-termism by extending the incentive horizon for management.
Hypothesis Development
We develop our hypothesis based on the conditions of the Agoglia, Doupnik and
Tsakumis (2011) study, which finds that principles-based standards are associated with less
aggressive financial reporting decisions. Importantly, the Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis
(2011) study uses a case context which does not provide any incentive to the financial
statement preparer which would lengthen their incentive horizon beyond considering the
short-term effects of the decision at hand. Therefore, we expect to replicate their findings
in our experimental condition which is focused on a short-term incentive horizon (i.e.
without a holding requirement for stock-based compensation). We expect that in this
condition, financial statement preparers are less likely to make an aggressive financial
reporting decision when provided with less precise accounting standards than will financial
statement preparers applying a more precise accounting standard.
The choice of incentive structure is an important choice made by the top
management of a firm. Firms structure their financial incentives (i.e. select a compensation
13

mix) in a manner which aligns with the goals and strategy of the firm (Schuler and
MacMillan 1984; Chen and Jermais 2014). A firm’s choice of financial incentive structure
may be viewed as a reflection of top management’s preferences and objectives (Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia 1990). Specifically, top management’s choice of a compensation mix which
uses restricted forms of stock-based compensation may be perceived as a signal that top
management is emphasizing long-term growth over short-term profitability. Given that
chief financial officers often become involved in aggressive reporting due to pressure from
the CEO (Feng et al. 2011), it is reasonable to expect that a signal that management is
emphasizing long-term profitability may encourage financial statement preparers to report
more conservatively. As rules-based standards make the correct or appropriate accounting
treatment much more transparent, it is likely easier for financial statement preparers to
select the conservative accounting treatment under rules-based standards.
The discussion above leads to the following pair of hypotheses that predict a
disordinal interaction of standard precision and incentive horizon:
Hypothesis 1a: When the incentive horizon is short-term, financial
statement preparers applying a less precise standard will be less likely to
make an aggressive financial reporting decision than will preparers
applying a more precise standard.
Hypothesis 1b: When the incentive horizon is long-term, financial
statement preparers applying a less precise standard will be more likely to
make an aggressive financial reporting decision than will preparers
applying a more precise standard.

14

III. RESEARCH METHOD
Participants and Design
Participants in the study are 147 experienced financial statement preparers (80 chief
financial or accounting officers, 18 controllers, 18 heads of finance,4 and 31 individuals in
other managerial finance or accounting positions5 from both the United States and
Bangladesh). The participants had an average of 17.7 years of professional work
experience, which was important given that our experiment requires the participants to
make a decision that would typically be made by experienced financial statement preparers.
To test our hypotheses, we conduct an experiment that asks participants to assume the role
of the financial statement preparer for a fictitious company in order to make a lease
classification decision, partially replicating the Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011)
study.

Within

the

experiment,

we

manipulate

our

constructs

of

interest:

INCENTIVE_HORIZON and STANDARD_PRECISION.6
Our first independent variable, INCENTIVE_HORIZON is manipulated at two
levels: short-term and long-term. Participants in the short-term condition are told that a
significant portion of management’s compensation is paid in stock which can be sold at
any time. In the long-term condition, participants are told that a significant portion of

4

The survey asked the participants current position in an open ended format. Thirty-five responses were
coded as heads of finance, which included the following: Director of Finance, Head of Accounting, Head of
Finance, VP of Finance or Accounting, Senior VP of Finance or Accounting, Executive VP of Finance or
Accounting.
5
The survey asked the participants current position in an open ended format. Twenty-one responses were
coded as heads of finance, which included the following: Accounting Manager, Finance Manager, Senior
Accountant, and Assistant Manager of Finance or Accounting.
6
We also manipulated the future self-continuity of the financial statement preparer using a prime
developed by Hershfield et al. (2012) as a second method of lengthening incentive horizon. We anticipated
a potential interactive effect of future-self continuity and standard precision on a financial statement
preparer’s decision to report aggressively. Preliminary analyses revealed there is no significant interactive
effect.
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management’s compensation is paid in stock which cannot be sold for five years or more.
The independent variable INCENTIVE_HORIZON is an indicator variable where zero
represents the short-term treatment condition, and one represents the long-term treatment
condition.
The variable STANDARD_PRECISION is manipulated at two levels: more precise
and less precise accounting standard. Participants in the more precise standard condition
are provided with rules-based lease capitalization criteria from ASC 840 Leases (i.e. lease
must be classified as a capital lease if the lease term is equal to 75% or more of the expected
economic useful life of the asset). Participants in the less precise standard condition are
provided with principles-based lease capitalization criteria from IAS 17 – Accounting for
Lease (i.e. lease must be classified as a capital lease if the lease term is for the major part
of the expected economic useful life of the asset).7 The independent variable
STANDARD_PRECISION is an indicator variable where zero represents the more precise
treatment condition, and one represents the less precise treatment condition.
Procedures
Participants were provided with the research instrument in the Appendix. The first
page of the instrument collects demographic information about our participants.8 Next,

7

It should be noted that a joint task force of the FASB and IASB recently issued revised standards for
accounting for leases (FASB issued February 25, 2016 and IASB issued January 13, 2016). The new
standards require all leases which do not meet the requirement of short-term leases (lease term less than 12months) be recognized on the balance sheet of the lessee. While the revised standards do substantially
change the lease classification criteria, we do not believe this impacts the generalizability of our study as
we are primarily interested in the effect of standard precision rather than the application of a particular
accounting standard.
8
The first page also contained the manipulation of a third independent variable, future self-continuity.
Future self-continuity is the extent to which an individual feels connected to the person they will become in
the future (Parfit 1971). It has been shown that a high level of future self-continuity is associated with
more ethical decision making (Hershfield et al. 2012). We did not detect a statistically significant
association between future self-continuity and our dependent variable.
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participants are asked to assume the role of controller for a fictitious company. The
participant is provided background information about the company’s financial health,
indicating that the company is just shy of reaching their consensus analyst forecasted
earnings for the year. All participants are told that company executives’ bonuses and a
significant portion of their salaries are paid in stock. Each participant is then provided with
either the short-term or long-term INCENTIVE_HORIZON manipulation.
The instrument then provides information about a lease classification issue which
the financial statement preparer is facing. Participants are provided with lease classification
criteria, receiving either the rules-based or the principles-based STANDARD_PRECISION
manipulation. Each participant is then told that for the decision at hand, they are to assume
the only relevant criterion is the ratio of the lease term to the expected economic useful life
of the leased asset. Participants are provided with the following definitions, which are
consistent with both ASC 840 and IAS 17:


“Lease term” is defined as the fixed non-cancelable term of the lease
plus all periods covered by bargain renewal options.



“Bargain renewal options” allow the lessee to renew the lease for a
rental sufficiently lower than the fair rental of the property such that
exercise of the option appears, at the inception of the lease, to be
reasonably assured.

The case facts state that the lease has a non-cancelable lease term of seven years, with the
option to renew the lease for an additional year. The participant must first judge whether
the rate for the additional year represents a bargain renewal option to determine if the
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additional year should be included in the lease term, and then judge whether the lease terms
meets the criteria for capitalization provided by the lease standard.
Participants are provided a summary of the financial impact of each of the two
accounting treatments. The summary demonstrates that the capitalization of the lease
provides less favorable financial results, whereas classifying the lease as an operating lease
will increase projected earnings to meet the consensus analyst forecast. Thus, management
has an incentive to record the lease as an operating lease.
Participants are then asked to assess the likelihood that they would classify this
lease as an operating lease or a capital lease on a 1-10 Likert-type scale where 1 represents
“Definitely classify as an operating lease” and 10 represents “Definitely classify as a capital
lease.” The participant’s lease classification decision is the dependent variable
(LEASE_CLASSIFICATION). After responding to the dependent measure, participants
responded to attention check and debriefing questions.9

IV. RESULTS
Hypotheses Tests
Our hypotheses examine two effects that are indicative of a disordinal interaction
between the precision of accounting standard and the incentive horizon of financial
statement preparers. The first hypothesis posits that when the incentive horizon is short-

9

The instrument also contained information about the Research & Development budget of the firm. This
portion of the instrument was designed to see the switch between real and accruals-based earnings
management under our experimental conditions. See Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) for a discussion on the
use of real and accrual-based earnings management. The participant was told that he or she could achieve
targeted earnings through decreasing the R&D budget for the remainder of the fiscal year. However, each
$100,000 decrease in the R&D budget results in a 1% chance of losing ground to a competitor. Participants
were then asked how much they would like to cut from the R&D budget with a maximum decrease of $4
million. The decrease amount represented our real earnings management dependent variable. Our
preliminary analysis shows statistically insignificant results for the real-earnings management dependent
variable.
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term, financial statement preparers applying a less precise standard will be less likely to
make an aggressive financial reporting decision than will preparers applying a more precise
standard. The second hypothesis proposes that when the incentive horizon is long-term,
financial statement preparers applying a less precise standard will be more likely to make
an aggressive financial reporting decision than will preparers applying a more precise
standard The hypotheses are tested using a 2 X 2 ANOVA, and results are reported in
Table 1.1 Panel B. The dependent variable is the lease classification decision, where
participants indicate their decision on a ten-point (1 = definitely classify as an operating
lease and 10 = definitely classify as a capital lease). The independent variables are
STANDARD_PRECISION
expectations,

there

is

and
a

INCENTIVE_HORIZON.
statistically

significant

Consistent
interaction

with

our

between

STANDARD_PRECISION and INCENTIVE_HORIZON (p = .019).
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
To test the specific hypotheses, we employ a linear contrast of cell means. We use
a contrast weight of +1 for the short-term incentive horizon and less precise treatment
condition, -1 for the short-term incentive horizon and more precise standard treatment
condition, -1 for the long-term incentive horizon and less precise standard treatment
condition, and +1 for the long-term incentive horizon and more precise standard treatment
condition. The means reported in Table 1.1 Panel A are consistent with our hypothesis, and
the planned contrast reported in Panel C supports the hypothesized interaction (F = 5.68, p
= 0.018). As suggested by Guggenmos, Piercey and Agoglia (2017) we also examine the
residual between-cells variance, which is insignificant (p = 0.808), indicating that the
contrast is a good fit for the data. Thus, H1a and H1b are supported.

19

[INSERT TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
It is important to explore whether these findings are a function of the standard
precision manipulation creating different perceptions of the lease criteria. Specifically, for
participants in the less precise standard precision condition, the term “for the major part
of” is open to their own interpretation, which can influence their lease classification.10 To
examine whether the more and less precise lease classification standards created different
perceptions of the meaning of “for the major part,” we asked participants the following
question:
If a criterion for classifying a lease as a capital lease is if the lease term is
for the major part of the economic life of the asset, what is the minimum
percentage you would assign to the expression “for the major part of”
(Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%). ________ %
Participants in the less precise condition perceived that “for the major part of” represented
a lower percentage (mean = 61.18, p = 0.018) relative to participants in the precise
treatment condition (mean = 68.83).11 Therefore, we include this perception as a covariate
and repeat the analyses above to test hypotheses 1a and 1b. The results are unchanged by
including this covariate.
As an additional test, we follow Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) and repeat our
analyses using only the participants who indicated that their perception of “for the major
part of” fell within the range of 70 percent to 80 percent. Thus, this test directly compares

10
If a participant in the less precise condition interprets the phrase “for the major part of” to be 69%, the
resulting classification of the lease is as a capital lease. In contrast, if the participant interprets “for the
major part of” to mean 80%, it would result in an operating lease. Therefore, we limit our analysis to
include only participants in the less precise condition whose responses were within the professional
judgment range of 70 – 80%.
11
Including this perception as a covariate does not change the results of hypotheses tests.
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participants who had similar perceptions of the lease criterion during the experiment. Of
the 71 participants in the less precise standard treatment, 26 responded within the 70-80
percent range. We retest our hypotheses using only these participants, and the results are
shown in Table 1.2. We find results consistent with our initial hypotheses testing, with a
significant interactive effect of STANDARD_PRECISION and INCENTIVE_HORIZON (F
= 2.86, p < .05). The planned contrast tests are also consistent. These results provide further
support for our findings for H1a and H1b.
Debriefing Analyses
The debriefing questions examine potential sources of influence on participants’
lease classification decisions (see Table 1.3). Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) find
evidence that concerns about second-guessing by regulators and concerns about the
economic substance of events mediate the relationship between standard precision and
decisions to engage in aggressive financial reporting. We measure perceptions of concern
for regulator second-guessing and economic substance in the debriefing questions and
examine whether these act as mediating variables in our study. An additional debriefing
item measures perceptions of the influence of negative consequences from the CEO.
Unlike Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011), we find no evidence that concerns
about economic substance or regulator second-guessing are mediating variables. Further,
by splitting the file into short-term and long-term incentive conditions, we examine
whether the economic substance of the lease or concern for second-guessing by regulators
are mediating variables in the short-term condition that is similar to the decision context in
Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011). Again, there is no evidence of mediation. To
further examine what is driving decisions, we examine whether concerns about CEO
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reprisals mediate the relationship between standard precision and decisions to report
aggressively. Again, there is no evidence of mediation for either the entire sample or split
samples for two incentive horizons.
There is no evidence of statistically significant differences between conditions for
the debriefing item which measures perceptions of the influence of negative consequences
from the CEO. This is important to note, as our theory posits that financial statement
preparers perceive the company’s selection of incentive type as a signal of the top
executive’s (i.e. the CEO) preference for short-term profitability or long-term growth.
Additional Tests
Given that our sample is comprised of financial statement preparers from both the
United States (61) and Bangladesh (86), we examine whether there is a country effect on
the results. Participants from the United States have frequent exposure to precise, rulesbased standards, which are prevalent in US GAAP. In contrast, Bangladesh follows the
Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards, which are closely modeled after International
Accounting Standards and IFRS. The Bangladesh standards are more principles-based in
nature, and tend to be less precise than US GAAP. It is possible that our results may be
influenced by preparers’ familiarity with different standard types. To explore the potential
for familiarity with different standards to influence our findings, we create an indicator
variable for the country of origin of our participants (0 = US participant, 1= Bangladesh
participant) and include this covariate in the model used to test our hypotheses. The
country indicator variable is not statistically significant (F = .906, p = 0.343), and results
of hypotheses tests are unchanged. Our results are robust for financial preparers who are
familiar with either more or less precise standards.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The FASB has recently issued two new accounting standards, which were
developed by joint task forces of the FASB and IASB, and are more principles-based in
nature. As a result, empirical evidence supporting how the precision of accounting
standards influences decisions made by financial statement preparers is of great importance
in today’s accounting environment. Prior literature supports the movement towards a more
principles-based approach to standard setting, as it finds that less precise standards are
more effective at reducing aggressive financial reporting relative to more precise, rulesbased standards. Our study examines whether these findings hold in other decision
contexts. Specifically, we examine how standard precision and the incentive horizon of
financial statement preparers jointly impact the decision to report aggressively.
Consistent with our expectations, we find a significant interactive effect of standard
precision and incentive horizon. In the short-term incentive horizon condition, we find
evidence of a statistically significant difference in aggressive financial reporting based on
standard precision. Specifically, we find that less precise standards are associated with a
reduction in aggressive financial reporting. However, we find that when the incentive
horizon is long-term, financial statement preparers applying less precise standards are more
likely to report aggressively than those applying more precise standards. This finding
suggests that the effects of standard precision are moderated by incentives, and that the
market implications of standard precision cannot be fully understood when standard
precision is examined in isolation.
Our findings have important implications for both practice and research. Our results
provide important insights which policy-makers may find of interest as they consider
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migrating additional accounting standards towards a more principles-based system. Our
findings suggest that such migration may not necessarily result in a reduction in aggressive
financial reporting, as prior studies have found. Further, in our setting, we find that a rulesbased approach appears to better constrain aggressive financial reporting when the
structure of financial incentives emphasizes long-term results. While this finding is
specific to our long-term incentive horizon context, given the prevalence of the use of
restricted forms of stock-based compensation in today’s business environment, this finding
may warrant further investigation.
Future research could extend our line of inquiry by examining standard precision
in alternate settings to identify other factors which moderate the relationship between
standard precision and aggressive financial reporting. It is important to note that our case
focuses on a specific context (lease classification), which has been revised by the joint task
force of the FASB and IASB. To broaden the generalizability of our findings, future
research could examine standard precision using alternative standards. Such research
would enhance our understanding of the role that standard precision plays in influencing
financial statement preparers’ decisions to report aggressively.
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PART 2
The Influence of Standard Precision and Decision Processing Mode on Aggressive
Financial Reporting
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, joint task forces comprised of members of both the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) have released updated standards on revenue recognition and lease accounting,
which aim to address the fundamental differences in the accounting standards of U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) and International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). The revised standards are an important consideration of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in their Global Accounting Standards
work plan, which addresses potential IFRS adoption within the United States (SEC 2010).
The product of the joint task forces is of particular interest given that U.S. GAAP has
traditionally differed from IFRS in the precision of accounting standards issued. While
U.S. GAAP is comprised of primarily rules-based accounting standards, which are more
precise in nature and provide bright-line tests and thresholds, IFRS is primarily comprised
of principles-based standards, which are less precise in nature.
Opponents of the transition to a standard system which is less precise in nature
maintain that more precise standards help to encourage comparability between companies
through the use of thresholds and tests that reduce the need to exercise judgment in the
decision process (Schipper 2003; Shortridge and Myring 2004). A reduction in the role of
judgment in the financial reporting process is expected to reduce the opportunity of
financial statement preparers to manage earnings (Wüstemann and Wüstemann 2010).
Scholarly research on standard precision generally does not support this perspective. Prior
25

research finds that more precise standards may encourage financial statement preparers to
structure transactions to achieve an incentive-consistent accounting treatment (Imhoff and
Thomas 1998) and that more precise standards are associated with more aggressive
financial reporting decisions by financial statement preparers (Agoglia, Doupnik &
Tsakumis 2011). I propose that standard precision may not operate in isolation, and that
the manner in which a financial statement preparer processes their decision (either
intuitively or deliberatively) may moderate the relationship between standard precision and
aggressive financial reporting.
Psychology literature has long supported the notion that an individual can process
decisions in one of two main ways: intuitively or deliberatively (Kahneman 2011;
Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Simon 1987). Intuitive
processing (often referred to as System 1 processing) is quick, emotive, and requires little
conscious effort to reach a conclusion. In contrast, deliberative processing (System 2) is
slower, analytical and requires intentional and effortful processing. Notably, deliberative
processing is capable of gathering information and applying rules-based analysis to
determine a decision outcome, which is a limitation of intuitive processing (Reynolds
2006). For this reason, it is generally presumed that accountants rely on deliberative
processing in the financial reporting process. Within the psychology literature, intuitive
processing is generally regarded as suboptimal to deliberative processing. Recently
literature has emerged which shows that the holistic approach utilized in intuitive
processing may yield more optimal (Zhong 2011; Kahneman and Klein 2009) and more
ethical (Reynolds 2006) decision making relative to deliberative processing.
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This study examines the joint effect of accounting standard precision and decision
processing mode on aggressive reporting decisions. To examine this issue, I conduct a 2 X
2 between-subjects experiment with participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The case
was applied as an automobile insurance decision (modified from the Agoglia, Doupnik &
Tsakumis 2011 lease classification decision) to make it more accessible to non-accounting
participants. I do not find evidence to support an interactive effect of standard precision
and decision processing mode on the level of aggressive financial reporting. However, the
results do support two significant main effects.
The results reveal a significant main effect of standard precision on the decision to
report aggressively. Consistent with prior literature, I find that less precise accounting
standards are associated with less aggressive reporting decisions. Notably, I find no
evidence that reporting decisions vary to a greater extent when applying less precise
standards. I also find evidence of a significant relationship between decision processing
mode and aggressive financial reporting. I find that intuitive processing is associated with
less aggressive reporting decisions relative to deliberative processing. This supports the
emerging trend which suggests that utilizing intuitive processing may result in optimal
decision making.
The study has important implications for both practitioners and regulators, as well
as academics. First, the findings pertaining to standard precision may provide important
insights which policy-makers may find of interest as they consider migrating additional
accounting standards towards a more principles-based system such as IFRS. The results
suggest that such a migration may be effective at reducing aggressive financial reporting
decisions by financial statement preparers. Also, I address a common concern about the
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transition to less precise standards; that less precise standards will increase variability in
reporting decisions, threatening comparability. I find no evidence to support this concern.
Secondly, it is commonly assumed that accounting professionals do and should rely
more heavily on deliberative processing than intuitive, given that a limitation of intuitive
processing is its inability to evaluate information relative to complex rules, which are ever
present in the accounting environment. Further, the math-like nature of most accounting
issues encourages an analytical approach (Griffith, Hammersley & Kadous 2014), which
requires deliberative processing. I find that intuitive processing is associated with a
reduction in aggressive reporting decisions. This speaks to the important role that intuitive
judgment can play in the accounting process, as well as the importance of considering how
to activate both processing modes throughout the accounting process to encourage less
aggressive financial reporting.
Lastly, this study contributes to an emerging stream of literature in both psychology
and accounting that refutes the common assumption that deliberative processing is
associated with optimal decision processing. Rather, I provide evidence which shows that
intuitive processing can yield more optimal decision making than deliberative processing
in certain contexts. This is important, as it provides further insight into how decision
processing can impact the decision outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Background and hypothesis
development are presented in Section II. Section III describes the research design. Results
are reported in Section IV, and Section V presents conclusions, limitations, and suggestions
for future research.

28

II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Standard Precision
In recent years, joint task forces comprised of members of both the FASB and IASB
have released updated standards on revenue recognition and lease accounting, which aim
to address the fundamental differences in the accounting standards of U.S. GAAP and
IFRS. The byproducts of these task forces are newly issued standards which replace the
transaction- and industry-specific guidelines that characterize rules-based standards with
broader, more principles-based guidance. In effect, the newly issued standards replace a
more precise, rules-based standard, common in U.S. GAAP, with a less precise, more
principles-based standard, similar to those of IFRS. As members of the accounting
community begin to process the changes brought about by the new standards,12 there is a
renewed interest in standard precision and its implications for judgment and decision
making.
The debate on standard precision draws arguments from both sides. Advocates for
more precise standards maintain that the guidelines and thresholds provide detailed
guidance for financial statement preparers (Schipper 2003; Shortridge and Myring 2004).
However, opponents argue that more precise standards may encourage self-interested
financial statement preparers to structure transactions to meet the criteria for a preferential
accounting treatment. One example of opportunistic transaction structuring took place
following the release of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)’s Statement of
Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 13 Accounting for Leases, which required
capital leases to be treated as assets and debt, which moved the disclosure of such from the

12

While the revenue recognition and lease accounting standards were issued in 2014 and 2016,
respectively, the effective dates of the standards are deferred until 2017 and 2019.
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footnotes to the balance sheet. Following the issuance of SFAS No. 13, there was a
significant decline in capital leases and a corresponding increase in operating leases by
companies that were previously capital-lease intensive (Imhoff and Thomas 1988).
Less precise standards provide financial statement preparers with the latitude to
select an accounting treatment which best represents the underlying economic reality of
the transaction. However, in order for these standards to be used effectively, financial
statement preparers must possess the desire to report unbiased results (Maines et al. 2003),
and have advanced knowledge sufficient to appropriately apply judgment. Former SEC
Chief Accountant Robert Herdman echoed this concern, noting that the application of less
precise standards “requires greater discipline by the corporate community, the accounting
profession, private sector standard-setting bodies, and, indeed, the SEC staff” in order to
maintain consistency (SEC 2002) Moreover, opponents of less precise standards suggest
that auditors and regulators may have less power to challenge aggressive financial positions
taken by companies due to the degree of judgment involved in applying less precise
standards (Wüstemann and Wüstemann 2010; Backof, Bamber & Carpenter 2016).
Several studies have examined the effect of standard precision on the decision to
report aggressively. Psaros and Trotman (2004) use a case where financial incentives exist
for the financial statement preparer to elect not to consolidate the financial statements of
their firm with a newly acquired firm, who had experienced a loss during the year. They
find that marginally more participants elect not to consolidate firm financials when
presented with more precise standards. This finding suggests that financial statement
preparers will report more aggressively when applying more precise accounting standards.
Additional support for this relationship is provided by Jamal and Tan (2010), which finds
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that less precise standards are associated with less aggressive financial reporting when the
auditor has a principles-oriented mindset. Further, Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011)
use a lease classification task to examine whether financial statement preparers choose to
record a lease as an operating lease (an aggressive classification) or capital lease when
there exists an economic incentive to classify the lease as an operating lease. They find that
participants applying a less precise standard are significantly less likely to report
aggressively than those applying a more precise standard. Mediation analysis reveals that
the relationship between standard precision and aggressive financial reporting is
attributable to an increase in concern for second-guessing by regulators when preparers are
applying less precise standards.13
Based on the findings above, I expect to find that less precise standards are associated with
less aggressive reporting decisions relative to more precise standards. Accordingly, I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Less precise standards (more precise standards) will be
associated with less aggressive (more aggressive) reporting decisions.
Decision Processing Mode
Psychology research has long supported an individual’s ability to sort information
and make decisions using different modes of decision processing (Kahneman 2011;
Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Simon 1987), namely
intuitive or deliberative processing modes.14 Intuitive processing is a quick and emotive

13
Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) find that an increase in concern for second guessing by
regulators influences the desire to report in a manner consistent with the economic substance of the
transaction, and results in less aggressive financial reporting
14
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) refer to these modes as System 1 (intuitive) and System 2 (deliberative)
processing.
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process where decisions are reached through subconscious holistic processing (Wolfe,
Christensen & Vandervale 2016; Dane and Pratt 2007, 2009; Lieberman 2000; Simon
1987). At a neurological level, intuitive processing relies on pattern-matching between
available information and stored heuristics or prototypes (Reynolds 2006). In contrast,
deliberative processing is slower, more effortful, and rational where a careful analysis is
performed to reach a decision (Kahneman 2011). Deliberative processing is capable of
gathering information and applying rules-based analysis to determine a decision outcome
(Reynolds 2006).
Certain individuals may exhibit a strong preference for either deliberative or
intuitive processing, whereas others take a more balanced approach relying on the mode
which is best suited for the decision context (Pacini and Epstein 1999). The evidence
suggests that certain contexts can encourage the use of either intuitive or deliberative
processing. For example, intense time pressure is associated with increased reliance on
intuitive processing (Kahneman and Klein 2009). In contrast, the need to process
complicated decision rules or integrate complex information stimulates the use of
deliberative processing (Reynolds 2006). This leads to the common assumption that
accounting professionals, who are required to adhere to strict rules and regulations to reach
financial reporting decisions, rely extensively on deliberative processing. While certain
contexts may encourage the use of one decision processing mode over the other, which
processing mode an individual is relying on for a particular decision can only be
determined through brain imaging, as each processing mode activates different regions of
the brain (Reynolds 2006).
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The extant literature tends to regard intuitive processing as suboptimal, finding that
decisions made relying on intuitive processing may ignore important informational
elements relative to those made using deliberative processing (Lieberman 2000; Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). This view is supported by research on ethical decision making.
Within this literature stream, there is a common assumption that deliberative processing
leads to more ethical (and thus, optimal) results (Etzioni 1988). This assumption relies on
various theories of decision making, such as expected utility theory or rational decision
making, all of which rely on a calculated and analytical, and thus deliberative, approach to
reaching the optimal decision. However, a growing body of literature provides evidence
which suggests that the effect of processing mode may not be uniform.
Reynolds (2006) takes a neurocognitive approach to examine ethical decisionmaking, finding that the most ethical decisions are made when intuitive processing is
involved.15 Further, several studies suggest that (given an appropriate context) intuitive
processing may yield decisions that are optimal to those reached through deliberative
processing (Zhong 2011; Kahneman and Klein 2009; Khatri and Ng, 2000; Blattberg and
Hoch 1990). These studies rely on the notion that intuitive processing involves the use of
a multi-faceted approach that aims to incorporate all available information into the decision
process. In contrast, when relying on deliberative processing, individuals may only focus
on the most salient pieces of information, regardless of the relevance (Zhong 2011; Wilson
and Schooler 1991).
The present study employs a modified version of the Agoglia, Doupnik and
Tsakumis (2011) lease classification case. Consistent with prior literature (Zhong 2011;

15

Reynolds (2006) does not explicitly refer to intuitive or deliberative processing, rather referring to the
neurological functions of the X-system (intuitive) and the C-system (deliberative).
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Wilson and Schooler 1991), I expect that individuals relying on deliberative processing
will attenuate to the most salient fact, namely the ratio of the lease term to the economic
useful life of the asset. As a result, their decision process may not reflect other pieces of
important information that are embedded in the case (e.g. the existence of a bargain renewal
option). In contrast, participants relying on intuitive processing are likely to take a holistic
approach to classifying the lease, incorporating all available case information, and that this
process will lead to more ethical decision making (Reynolds 2006). Accordingly, I
hypothesize that participants relying on intuitive processing will make more ethical, and
thus more conservative, decisions.
Hypothesis 2: Intuitive processing (deliberative processing) will be
associated with less aggressive (more aggressive) decision making.
Process Accountability
Accountability occurs when an individual’s performance on a task or decision is
being evaluated or monitored, and when there are potential penalties or rewards associated
with the outcome (Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996). When and how accountability influences
a decision is of great importance. Tetlock (1983) posits that the influence of accountability
is significantly impacted by the ambiguity of the associated task. Specifically, if the
decision maker knows the response that an evaluator will find acceptable, the decision
maker is likely to conform to that outcome. However, when the perspective of the evaluator
is unknown to the decision maker (i.e. due to ambiguity in the guidance which makes
multiple outcomes a possibility), the decision maker is likely to dedicate significantly more
effort to the task. Tetlock finds that the increased effort spent in the decision process is
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associated with higher levels of judgment accuracy, judgment consistency, the complexity
of thinking and amount of information processed.
Siegel-Jacobs and Yates (1996) extend Tetlock’s research, by separating
accountability into two types: process accountability and outcome accountability. An
outcome accountable individual believes that they will be held responsible for the quality
of the outcome produced. In contrast, a process accountable individual perceives that they
will be evaluated on the sufficiency of their decision-making process. Reflecting these
accountability types back to Tetlock’s discussion of task ambiguity, it is important to note
that Tetlock’s first condition, where the decision maker knows the response that an
evaluator would find acceptable and conforms to that response, is an example of outcome
accountability. The second condition, where the perspective of the evaluator is unknown
and the decision maker responds by strengthening their process is an example of process
accountability. Consistent with the findings of Tetlock, they find that process accountable
individuals performed significantly better than non-accountable individuals in a decision
task. More specifically, individuals who were told that they would be evaluated based on
their decision process more accurately assessed the likelihood of an event occurring than
did those in either the no accountability or outcome accountability conditions.
In the accounting literature, several studies have examined the role of
accountability along with standard precision. Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011)
examine the relationship between standard precision and aggressive financial reporting,
finding that less precise standards are associated with less aggressive reporting. Through
path analysis, they find that the observed relationship is influenced by increased concern
for second-guessing by regulators. Financial statement preparers’ concerns for second-

35

guessing by regulators may be considered to be a measure of accountability, as
accountability is merely when an individual feels they may be evaluated, and that there
may be consequences associated with such an evaluation (Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996).
Peytcheva, Wright and Majoor (2013) directly examine the influence process
accountability, along with standard precision, on auditors’ motivations and evidence
demands. They theorize and find that the relationship between accounting standard
precision and auditors’ epistemic motivation and demand for audit evidence is driven by
process accountability. Specifically, they find that less precise standards are associated
with an increase in process accountability and, such heightened process accountability is
associated with higher epistemic motivation in auditors, which in turn leads to a greater
demand for audit evidence. These findings are consistent with the findings of prior
psychology research on process accountability and suggest that less precise accounting
standards may invoke a more effortful decision process than more precise accounting
standards. If a more effortful decision process is the causal mechanism that drives the
observed effects of standard precision on the decision at hand (e.g. management’s financial
reporting decision or auditor evidence demand), it is important to consider how this
relationship will be impacted by decision processing mode.
The prior literature has examined how deliberative or intuitive processing
influences decision outcome based on task characteristics (Inbar, Cone & Gilovich 2010;
Hammond et al. 1987). These studies show that intuitive processing is less effective with
tasks that can be decomposed and solved sequentially or mathematically. Making a
financial reporting decision when applying a more precise standard involves gathering
relevant information, calculating key values (if necessary) and comparing the values to the
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reference point provided by the standard to determine the appropriate accounting treatment.
This can be seen as akin to the sequential and mathematical task, described in the
psychology literature as being less suited to intuitive processing. With these tasks, intuitive
processing may produce a decision which deviates from the optimal decision. In contrast,
intuitive processing performs well on judgment tasks, where the decision maker takes a
more holistic approach (Inbar, Cone & Gilovich 2010). When making a financial reporting
decision under less precise standards, a financial statement preparer must still gather
relevant information to support the decision relative to the guidance of the standard, but
then requires the application of judgment to determine the appropriate treatment.
Accordingly, I hypothesize that decision processing mode and standard precision will
interact to impact aggressive financial reporting.
Hypothesis 3: Those relying on intuitive processing will be less (more)
likely to make an unethical decision than individuals relying on deliberative
processing when applying less precise (more precise) standards.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Design
The purpose of this study is to examine how standard precision and decision
processing mode influence decision making. To address my research question, I use a 2 X
2 between-subjects experimental design, which manipulates the precision of accounting
standard (less precise or more precise) and includes a prime designed to activate a specific
decision processing mode (intuitive versus deliberative).
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Participants
I recruited 493 total participants for the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
propriety data collection service. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) is a crowdsourcing
marketplace where requesters offer compensation to workers in exchange for completion
of human intelligence tasks (HITs). AMT is becoming an increasingly common source for
recruiting participants for academic studies in the field of accounting (Rennekamp 2012;
Brasel et al. 2016). Further, studies performed using AMT have been shown to replicate a
wide range of prior findings (Mason and Suri 2012). Additionally, it has been found that
workers can be suitable proxies for non-experts, and exhibit higher motivation than
students but at a lower cost (Farrell, Grenier and Leiby 2016).
The selection of study participants should be driven by the demands of the
experiment being performed (Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson 2002). This particular
research study aims to examine the underlying psychological effects of decision processing
mode and standard precision. Notably, accounting standard precision is merely an
extension of the substance-over-form debate which has presented in many fields (most
commonly in ethics16 and law17) that aims to address how individuals respond when rules
emphasize substance over form. No particular subject-matter expertise is required to gain
meaningful insight as to how my two independent variables, standard precision and
decision processing mode, impact decision making. Successful completion of the research
instrument only requires that the participants be fluent in English pay careful attention to
the task. Accordingly, I restrict my sample to include only AMT workers within the United

16

In the ethics literature, the substance-over-form debate is often looked at with respect to corporate codes
of conduct (Raiborn and Payne 1990)
17
In the litigation setting, jurors with no particular subject-matter expertise are routinely expected to make
decisions in accordance with legal standards. See Katz (2004) and Grossman (2003) for discussion.
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States who have an approval rating of at least 95%18. Participants indicated that they have
completed an average of 4.0 business courses, and 2.3 accounting courses. Fifty-seven
percent of the participants are male. Participants were compensated an effective hourly rate
of $10.16, which is above the median wage for most AMT tasks (Horton and Chilton 2010).
Experimental Design
To examine this important issue, I use a modified version of the Agoglia, Doupnik
and Tsakumis (2011) lease classification case. The Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011)
case asks participants to assume the role of a financial statement preparer. Participants are
then presented with lease classification criteria and asked how to classify the lease. To
make this case more accessible to participants without accounting expertise, I modify the
context to reflect an individual completing insurance paperwork about an automobile they
have recently leased, rather than a financial reporting decision. Financial information
within the case is also scaled accordingly to reflect the context.
The instrument begins with participants answering brief questions to gather
demographic information. After completing the demographic data questions, participants
are asked a series of five questions which either require them to compute five mathematical
problems or to provide an emotive response when presented with a list of five terms. This
task, which is the DECISION_PROCESSING_MODE manipulation, is designed to activate
either an intuitive or deliberative processing mode in the participant.

18
AMT approval ratings are calculated as the percentage of HITs completed which are approved for
compensation by the HIT requester, signaling that the AMT worker has successfully completed the
HIT.AMT guidelines allow HIT requesters to reject the work of an AMT worker who does not successfully
complete the task (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010). AMT workers with an approval rate in excess of
95% have a lower manipulation check failure rating and provide higher quality data than do other workers
(Peer et al. 2014)
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Participants are then informed that they have just leased an automobile and are
completing required paperwork for their insurance company. The participant is told that
the insurance company needs to gain an understanding of the structure of the lease
agreement in order to calculate the appropriate insurance premium. The participant is then
presented

with

the

criteria

for

classifying

the

lease,

which

contains

the

STANDARD_PRECISION manipulation, as well as the definitions of lease term and
bargain renewal option.
The case facts state that the automobile lease has a non-cancelable term of three
years, with the option to renew the lease for an additional 18-month period at the end of
the non-cancelable lease term. The participant must first assess if the rate for the additional
year represents a bargain renewal option and thus should be included in the lease term, and
then assess whether the ratio of the lease term to the economic useful life of the asset (six
years) to determine the appropriate classification.
The participant is then presented with the insurance premiums resulting from each
lease classification choice. There exists an economic incentive which favors classifying the
lease as an operating lease, as classifying the lease as an operating lease results in a lower
insurance premium. Each participant is then asked to indicate the appropriate classification
of their automobile lease. The experiment ends with a series of debriefing questions. The
full experimental instrument is included in the appendix.

Independent Variables
The first independent variable DECISION_PROCESSING_MODE is manipulated
at two levels (intuitive and deliberative). The prime, which has been used to effectively
stimulate decision processing mode in prior literature (Rose et al. 2017; Zhong, 2011) was
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developed to stimulate intuitive or deliberative processing by encouraging participants to
either calculate and report consensus (deliberative) or examine and reporting their feelings
(intuitive) (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004; Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). In both
conditions, participants are presented with five questions designed to activate a specific
mindset. In the deliberative condition, the five questions that require calculations (e.g. “if
an object travels at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet will it
travel in 360 seconds?”). In contrast, in the intuitive condition, participants are asked five
questions designed to elicit an emotive response (e.g. “when you hear the name “George
W. Bush, what do you feel? Please use one word to describe your predominant feeling.”)
The variable STANDARD_PRECISION is manipulated at two levels: more precise
and less precise accounting standards. Participants in the more precise standard condition
are provided with rules-based classification guidelines on which to base their lease
classification decision. The terminology in the provided guidance is based on the lease
capitalization criteria from ASC 840 Leases. The guidance instructs participants that the
lease must be classified as a capital lease if the lease term is equal to 75% or more of the
expected economic useful life of the asset. Participants in the less precise treatment
condition are provided with principles-based classification guidelines based on the lease
capitalization criteria from IAS 17 – Accounting for Leases. The guidance provided to
participants states that the lease must be classified as a capital lease if the lease term is for
the major part of the expected economic useful life of the asset.19

19

It should be noted that a joint task force of the FASB and IASB recently issued revised standards for
accounting for leases (FASB issued February 25, 2016 and IASB issued January 13, 2016). The new
standards require all leases which do not meet the requirement of short-term leases (term less than 12months) to be recognized on the balance sheet of the lessee. While the revised standards do substantially
change the lease classification criteria, I do not believe this impacts the generalizability of the study as I am
primarily interested in the effect of standard precision rather than the application of a particular accounting
standard.
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Measured Variables
Individuals may have a natural inclination to rely more heavily on deliberative or
intuitive processing (Pacini and Epstein 1999). As a result, an individual with a strong
preference for either intuitive or deliberative processing may be less responsive to the
effects of priming. As a result, I also measure individual inclination to rely on a specific
processing mode. Within the psychology literature, there are two commonly used measures
of an individuals’ inclination towards either deliberative or intuitive processing. The first
measure uses a portion of the modified Rational-Experiential Index (REI) developed by
Epstein, Pacini and Norris (1998),20 which measures inclination to relying on intuitive
processing. The REI scale asks the individual to self-report their agreement with a series
of statements designed to capture intuitive behavior (e.g. “I can usually feel when a person
is right or wrong even if I can’t explain how I know”). The scale asks individuals to assess
their agreement with the statements using a Likert-type scale where one represents
“strongly disagree” and six represents “strongly agree.” REI-scale items are listed in the
appendix.
To calculate this measure, I partition scores into three groups to create an
REI_SCORE indicator variable: low REI (individual mean score on the scale is greater than
one standard deviation less than the overall mean response), average REI (individual mean
score on the scale is within one standard deviation of the overall mean response), and high
REI (individual mean score on the scale is greater than one standard deviation higher than
the overall mean response). Low REI scores are indicative of a preference for deliberative
processing, whereas a high REI score is indicative of a preference for intuitive processing.

20

The modified Rational Experiential Index is based on a larger scale developed by Esptein, Pacini, DenesRaj and Heieir (1996).
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An average REI score suggests the individual may not exhibit a strong preference for either
processing mode. The variable REI_SCORE is an indicator variable where participants
whose mean score on the scale falls greater than one standard deviation below the overall
mean (placing them in the low REI group) are assigned a zero. Participants within one
standard deviation of the overall mean, indicative of an average REI score, are assigned a
one, while participants whose mean score is greater than one standard deviation above the
overall mean, considered to be high REI, are assigned a two.
The second measure of decision processing mode uses a series of logic puzzles
introduced by Kahneman (2011). The series of three questions is designed such that an
intuitive approach will likely yield an incorrect response to each question. For example,
one question asks participants the cost of a ball, given two pieces of information: (1) the
ball and a bat in total cost $1.10, and (2) the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. The common
intuitive response is that the ball costs $.10, which is incorrect as it violates the second
requirement. Individuals who take a deliberative approach and use a mathematical equation
should arrive at the correct answers of $.05. The Kahneman questions are listed in the
appendix. The variable KAHNEMAN_SCORE is the number of correct responses to the
questions (indicative of deliberative processing), ranging from zero to three. A low score
on the Kahneman puzzles is indicative of a preference for intuitive processing, whereas a
high score is indicative of a preference for deliberative processing.
While both of these measures have been used in the psychology literature to
measure individual preference for either deliberative or intuitive processing, it should be
noted that the outcome of these scales has not been examined jointly. If the scales are strong
measures of inclination to rely on decision processing modes, there should be a significant
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negative correlation between the two scales. Correlation analyses indicated that there is a
significant negative correlation between the two variables (r = -.190, p < .01). That is, there
is a strong inverse relationship between KAHNEMAN_SCORE and REI_SCORE. This
suggests that both scales similarly capture an individual’s disposition to rely on either
intuitive or deliberative processing.
Dependent Variable
The

dependent

variable

is

the

lease

classification

decision

(LEASE_CLASSIFICATION) made by participants. Participants are asked to assess the
likelihood that they would classify this lease as an operating lease or a capital lease on a 110 Likert-type scale where one represents “definitely classify as an operating lease” and
ten represents “definitely classify as a capital lease.” Choosing to classify the lease as an
operating lease is the preferential treatment (as it yields lower insurance premiums for the
participant), and is thus considered to be an aggressive classification choice.

IV. RESULTS
Attention, Manipulation and Completion Checks
In order to determine whether participants attended to the decision processing
mode manipulation, the responses to the math problems and emotional responses were
reviewed. All participants in both conditions provided appropriate responses. Consistent
with prior research on decision processing mode, participants were not asked how the
task impacted their processing, as these effects are subconscious and participants are
unlikely to be aware of their decision processing (Zhong 2011; Rose et al. 2017). In order
to determine whether participants attended to the STANDARD_PRECISION
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manipulation, I asked each participant which standard precision criteria they received. Of
the initial 493 participants, 120 failed to identify which standard precision criteria they
had previously read (see Table 2.1). This represents a manipulation check failure rate of
24.3%, which is consistent with prior research involving Mechanical Turk participants
(Goodman, Cryder & Cheema 2012). Participants who failed to successfully complete the
manipulation check were removed from further analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Standard Precision and Aggressive Reporting
To test my hypotheses, I use a 2 x 2 ANOVA. My first hypothesis predicts a main
effect of standard precision on the decision to report aggressively. Specifically, hypothesis
one predicts that less (more) precise accounting standards are associated with less (more)
aggressive reporting. My results show there is no statistically significant difference
between the less precise and more precise STANDARD_PRECISION treatment conditions
(F = 1.992, p = 0.159). Results are presented in Table 2.2.
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
It is possible that the insignificant findings may relate to how participants in the
less precise treatment condition interpret the phrase “for the major part of.” It is important
to ensure that the less precise standard precision manipulation does not create a different
decision context for participants. For example, if a participant in the less precise treatment
condition interprets the phrase “for the major part of” to be 65%, the resulting classification
of the lease is as a capital lease. In contrast, if the participant interprets “for the major part
of” to mean 80%, it would result in an operating lease. To examine whether the more and
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less precise lease classification standards created different perceptions of the meaning of
“for the major part,” the research instrument includes the following question:
If a criterion for classifying a lease as a capital lease is if the lease term is
for the major part of the economic life of the asset, what is the minimum
percentage you would assign to the expression “for the major part?”
(Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%). ________ %
Following Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011), I restrict the sample to include
only those participants who indicated that their perception of “for the major part of” fell
within the range of 70 – 80 percent. This ensures that I am only comparing participants
who have similar perceptions of the lease criterion used in the experiment. After removing
all participants in the less precise treatment condition whose interpretation of “for the major
part of” fell outside of the range of 70 – 80 percent, the remaining sample included 77
participants in the less precise treatment condition (see Table 2.1). The restricted sample
should provide a more meaningful basis for comparison.
Due to the removal of participants in the less precise treatment condition only (no
such participants were removed from the more precise treatment condition), the cell sizes
between treatment conditions are unbalanced (77 in the less precise condition, 170 in the
more precise condition).21 Due to the unbalanced cell sizes, the homogeneity of variance
assumption of ANOVA is violated. This suggests that the use of a non-parametric test,

21

It is important to consider whether the unbalanced cell sizes based on the reduction of the sample size
due to interpretation of the phrase “for the major part of” presents any validity issues for my findings. To
address this issue, I also reviewed the more precise treatment condition to assess their perception of the
phrase. I find that 76 participants in the more precise condition interpreted the phrase “for the major part
of” within the relevant range of 70-80%. This is consistent with the number of participants who interpreted
the phrase within the relevant range in the less precise treatment condition. I reperform test of hypothesis
one using a one-way ANOVA (untabulated), and find results consistent with the Kruskal-Wallis H test (F =
2.984, p =0.086).
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namely the Kruskal-Wallis H Test, is the most appropriate method of analysis. After
restricting the sample to include only those participants in the less precise treatment
condition who interpret “for the major part of” to be between 70 and 80 percent, I perform
a Kruskal-Wallis H test to examine the relationship between standard precision and
aggressive financial reporting. The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there is a significant
difference in LEASE_CLASSIFICATION between the less precise and more precise
STANDARD_PRECISION treatment conditions (χ2 = 3.657, p = 0.056), with a mean lease
classification of 5.38 for more precise accounting standards and 6.31 for less precise
accounting standards. Results are included in Table 2.3. These results suggest that financial
statement preparers applying a less precise standard are less likely to report aggressively
(classify the lease as an operating lease) than those applying more precise accounting
standards. These findings provide support for hypothesis one.
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
Comparability
With respect to the discussion on shifting U.S. GAAP towards standards more
comparable with IFRS, opponents of such convergence often suggest that less precise
standards (principles-based) may result in less comparability across firms (Nelson 2003;
Schipper 2003). If this is the case, it should result in a greater degree of variability in the
classification decisions made by participants under less precise standards. As shown in
Table 2.2, there is very little difference in the variability of LEASE_CLASSIFICATION as
measured by the standard deviation. Levene’s test for equality of variances reveals that
there is no significant difference between the two groups (F = 1.833, p = .177). The results
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suggest that there may not be empirical support for the notion that the application of less
precise accounting standards will lead to a decline in comparability between firms.
Decision Processing Mode and Aggressive Reporting
The second hypothesis predicts that using intuitive (deliberative) processing will
be associated with less (more) aggressive reporting decisions. The results reveal a
statistically

significant

association

DECISION_PROCESSING_MODE

between
and

LEASE_CLASSIFICATION (F = 3.278, p < 0.1).

the
the

independent
dependent

variable
variable

The results show a mean lease

classification of 5.33 for the deliberative treatment condition, compared to a 5.92 mean
lease classification for the intuitive treatment condition. The results show that, consistent
with hypothesis two, use of intuitive processing is associated with less aggressive reporting
decisions. Results are reported in Table 2.2.
It is possible that the marginal significance of these findings is attributable to strong
individual preferences for one processing mode over another. While most individuals rely
on a balanced approach between the two modes of decision processing and can be
encouraged to use mode over the other by changing contextual features or priming, there
are individuals who exhibit strong preferences for one mode over the other.22 For those
individuals with a strong preference for one mode, a prime may be less effective at
stimulating the use of an alternative decision processing mode. As a result, considering

22
Consider a student with a strong preference for analytical processing completing a timed standardized
exam in mathematics. Time pressure is one task element which encourages the use of intuitive processing
(Kahneman and Klein 2009). Many students will recognize the time constraint, and adjust their processing
approach by relying on estimation or other time-saving heuristics that are part of intuitive processing.
However, certain students will be committed to fully solving each problem mathematically, and may run
out of time. These students exhibit strong preferences for deliberative processing.
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individual preferences for decision processing mode may reveal an even stronger
relationship between decision processing mode and aggressing reporting decisions.
As a test of the robustness of my findings, I examine the relationship between measures of
individual preference for decision processing mode and aggressive reporting. To do so, I
use two measures which capture an individual’s preference to rely on a particular decision
processing mode, KAHNEMAN_SCORE and REI_SCORE. Specifically, the variable
KAHNEMAN_SCORE measures preference for deliberative processing, whereas
REI_SCORE captures preference for intuitive processing.
I first examine the hypothesis using the variable KAHNEMAN_SCORE.23 The
results show that there is a statistically significant difference in LEASE_CLASSIFICATION
based on KAHNEMAN_SCORE (chi-square = 10.932, p < 0.05). Specifically, there is a
statistically significant difference in means between those who are highly intuitive (mean
= 6.26) and those who are highly deliberative (mean = 4.87). Descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 2.4 Panel A, with the Kruskal-Wallis H Test results in Panel B. Next,
the variable KAHNEMAN SCORE is replaced with REI_SCORE, and the tests of hypothesis
two are repeated. The results (descriptive statistics and Kruskal-Wallis H Test results are
reported in Table 2.4 Panels C and D) reveal the same pattern of findings. Those who score
as highly intuitive are significantly less likely to report aggressively than those who score
as highly deliberative. Taken together, these results provide further support for the
relationship between intuitive processing and less aggressive financial reporting as
predicted in hypothesis two.

23

The variable Kahneman Score represents the score on the three logic puzzles outlined in Kahneman
(2011) from zero to three. A score of zero represents a highly intuitive individual, whereas a score of three
shows a strong preference for deliberative processing.
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[INSERT TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
These findings reveal that intuitive processing is associated with a reduction in
aggressing reporting decisions. This is consistent with an emerging trend in the literature
finding that intuitive processing, which encourages a holistic approach to decision making,
can result in more ethical decision making. Accountants are presumed to rely more heavily
on deliberative processing, as problems with math-like characteristics and computations
require analytical processing (Griffith, Hammersley & Kadous 2014). However, these
findings suggest that stimulating intuitive processing in accountants may result in a
reduction in aggressive reporting decisions.
Joint Effect of Standard Precision and Decision Processing Mode
Hypothesis three predicts a disordinal interaction between standard precision and
decision processing mode. However, I do not find any evidence of a significant interaction
between STANDARD_PRECISION and DECISION_PROCESSING_MODE (F=2.526, p =
.599). Results are reported in Table 2.2 and shown in Figure 2.1.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
To explore these findings, I examine the role of process accountability. I theorized
that individuals provided with intuitive processing would result in a reduction in feelings
of process accountability (due to the lack of observable process in intuitive processing)
and that the reduction in process accountability would disrupt the observed relationship
between less precise standards and a reduction in aggressive reporting.
In the experiment debriefing, participants were asked to complete a series of
questions designed to measure their feelings of process versus outcome accountability.
Participants were first asked to what extent their decision was based on a desire to avoid
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questioning from someone who might evaluate their decision. There was no significant
difference in the desire to avoid questioning from evaluators by treatment condition (F =
0.013, p = .911). Next, participants were asked to what extent they felt evaluators would
focus on their decision process and their decision outcome. There was no significant
difference in perception that evaluators would focus on decision process (F = 0.093, p =
.761) or decision outcome (F = .348, p = .556) by treatment condition. These findings
may help to explain the lack of disordinal interaction, as participants did not differ in
accountability based on decision processing mode.
The results of this experiment reveal several interesting patterns. First, I find evidence
which supports a main effect of standard precision. The results show that less precise
standards are associated with less aggressive financial reporting decisions. This pattern of
findings is consistent with hypothesis one, and the findings of prior literature (Agoglia,
Doupnik & Tsakumis 2011), providing further support for the relationship between
standard precision and aggressive financial reporting.
The results also show a significant association between decision processing mode
and aggressive financial reporting. The findings reveal that intuitive processing is
associated with less aggressive financial reporting decisions relative to deliberative
processing. These findings support an emerging trend in the literature by refuting the notion
that intuitive processing results in sub-optimal decision making.

V. CONCLUSION
The FASB has recently issued two new accounting standards, which were
developed by joint task forces of the FASB and IASB, and are more principles-based in
nature. As a result, empirical evidence supporting how the precision of accounting
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standards influences decision making is of great importance in today’s accounting
environment. Prior literature supports the movement towards a more principles-based
approach to standard setting, as it finds that less precise standards are more effective at
reducing aggressive financial reporting relative to more precise, rules-based standards. The
present study examines whether these findings hold in other decision contexts. Specifically,
I examine how standard precision and decision processing mode impact the decision to
report aggressively.
Consistent with prior literature (Psaros and Trotman 2004; Agoglia, Doupnik &
Tsakumis 2011), I find that less precise accounting standards are associated with less
aggressive financial reporting decisions relative to more precise accounting standards. My
findings contribute to this stream of literature which suggests that migration of standards
towards a less precise standard system may result in a reduction of aggressive financial
reporting decisions. Further, I find no difference in the variability in financial reporting
decisions reached under either standard. This finding helps to alleviate a concern that
opponents such a migration have frequently expressed; that less precise standards will lead
to greater variability in reporting decisions and threaten comparability across firms. These
results may provide important insights which policy-makers may find of interest as they
consider migrating additional accounting standards towards a more principles-based
system.
The experiment also examined the role of dual processing theory. The results reveal
a significant association between decision processing mode and aggressive financial
reporting. Specifically, I find that intuitive processing is associated with less aggressive
reporting decisions. This finding has important implications for practitioners, given that
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accountants are presumed to rely on deliberative processing, as problems with math-like
traits encourage an analytical approach (Griffith, Hammersley & Kadous 2014), which
requires the use of deliberative processing. However, these findings suggest that
encouraging intuitive processing in accountants may result in a reduction in aggressive
reporting decisions. This finding has important implications for practitioners, as it suggests
that effectively stimulating intuitive processing during the financial reporting process may
reduce aggressive financial reporting decisions.
It is important to note that the case focuses on a specific context (lease
classification), which has been revised by the joint task force of the FASB and IASB. To
broaden the generalizability of my findings, future research could examine standard
precision using alternative standards. Such research would enhance our understanding of
the role that standard precision plays in influencing financial statement preparers’ decisions
to report aggressively. Another limitation of the study is that the study uses AMT
participants to examine the influence of the precision of regulations and decision
processing mode on aggressive decisions. It is possible that subjects with accounting
expertise may respond differently to standard precision and processing mode primes due
to experience and training. Future research could examine the effects of decision
processing mode and standard precision with participants possessing greater accounting
knowledge to test the generalizability of my findings.
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PART 3
The Impact of Accounting Standard Precision on Auditor Judgment
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressed support for
the convergence of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (SEC 2010). Traditionally, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the standard setting body responsible for
GAAP, has issued accounting standards that are more rules-based (more precise) in nature
relative to the standards of IFRS. Opponents of the convergence argue that transitioning to
a principles-based (less precise) standard system will pose a threat to audit quality, as less
precise standards allow for greater management discretion, which may make it more
difficult for auditors to challenge management’s selection of accounting treatments (SEC
2010). Further, auditing the application of less precise standards may invite greater
variability in auditor judgment which poses an additional threat to the comparability of
financial statements across firms. Indeed, as the FASB considers migrating GAAP towards
a less precise system of accounting standards, evidence supporting how auditors respond
to the precision of accounting standards is of great importance.
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the precision of accounting standard
impacts several dimensions of audit performance: constraint of aggressive financial
reporting, susceptibility to influence by client management, and variability in auditor
judgment. Several studies have examined auditor constraint of aggressive financial
reporting under differently precise accounting standards finding mixed results (Backof,
Bamber & Carpenter 2016; Peytcheva, Wright & Majoor 2013; Cohen et al. 2013). Backof,
Bamber and Carpenter (2016) report evidence that auditors are less likely to constrain
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aggressive financial reporting when applying less precise standards. In contrast, Peytcheva,
Wright and Majoor (2013) and Cohen et al. (2013) provide evidence that less precise
standards are associated with greater auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting.
The present study aims to further explore the relationship between standard precision and
auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting.
Beyond providing additional evidence with respect to auditor constraint of
aggressive financial reporting, this study aims to address other aspects of audit judgment
that may be impacted by the proposed migration of accounting standards (SEC 2010).
Critics of such a transition argue that auditors will be more greatly influenced by the
decisions of management when auditing the application of less precise standards
(McCarthy and McCarthy 2014). As judgment plays a more prominent role in the audit
process when auditing the application of less precise standards, auditors may become
increasingly susceptible to judgment biases. Specifically, auditors may be more susceptible
knowledge bias, whereby the auditor is unable to disregard knowledge of management’s
decision and incorporates that decision into their own judgment process (McDaniel and
Kinney 1995; Kennedy 1995). Auditors perceive that they have less power to challenge the
selection of aggressive accounting treatments chosen by management when applying less
precise accounting standards (Backof, Bamber & Carpenter 2016). The perception of a
reduction in power to challenge management’s selection of accounting treatment, coupled
with an increase in susceptibility to knowledge biases may result in greater likelihood that
the auditor accepts management’s choice of accounting treatment. I investigate whether
auditors are less likely to challenge management’s selection of accounting treatments when
applying less precise accounting standards.
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Opponents of the transition to a less precise standard system argue that
comparability, the very purpose of establishing accounting standards (FASB 1980), is
threatened by the level of judgment necessary in less precise standard systems.
Specifically, there exist concerns that there will be increased variability in audit
conclusions when auditing the application of less precise standards relative to more precise
standards (SEC 2010). An increase in the variability of audit conclusions should result in
a decrease in comparability across firms. Thus, it is important to consider how the precision
of accounting standard will impact the variability of auditor judgment.
To examine these issues, I conduct a 2 X 3 between-subjects experiment where I
manipulate the precision of accounting standard (either more precise or less precise) and
knowledge of management’s choice of accounting treatment (as either no knowledge of
management’s classification, classification set 1, or classification set 2). The study uses a
lease classification audit task used in prior standard precision research (Backof, Bamber &
Carpenter 2016; Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis 2011). One hundred and forty-one
undergraduate and graduate accounting students participated in a lease classification case
where they are asked to assume the role of staff auditor. The dependent variable captures
the auditor’s assessment of the appropriate lease classification on a 1-10 Likert-type scale
where one represents an operating lease (an aggressive classification) and ten represents a
capital lease (the conservative treatment).
Consistent with expectations, I find that the precision of accounting standards is a
significant determinant of auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting. Specifically,
when auditors apply less precise accounting standards, they are more likely to constrain
aggressive financial reporting by management. This finding supports the notion that
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transitioning to a less precise standard system may result in better constraint of aggressive
financial reporting by staff auditors. Further, I find no evidence of increased variability in
auditor judgment when applying less precise standards. Rather, I find that auditor judgment
varies to a lesser extent when applying less precise accounting standards. Lastly, I find no
evidence that auditors are more likely to accept management’s selection of accounting
treatment when auditing the application of less precise standards. This may alleviate
concerns that auditors will be less likely to challenge aggressive financial reporting
decisions by management under less precise standards.
This study is important for several reasons. This study examines the potential audit
consequences of the FASB’s ongoing trend of converging U.S. GAAP to IFRS through the
issuance of less precise accounting standards. First, the study contributes to the stream of
literature which demonstrates that auditors may better constrain aggressive financial
reporting, which supports the transition to a less precise standard system. Secondly, the
study has important implications for regulators, as the findings address two major concerns
voiced by opponents of the transition (SEC 2010): that less precise standards will lead to
greater variability in auditor judgment, and that auditors’ ability to challenge aggressive
financial reporting will decrease under less precise standards. I find no evidence to support
either of these concerns.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides background
information and develops our hypotheses. Sections III describes the experiment used to test
our hypotheses. Section IV presents the results of the study. Conclusions are presented in
Section V.
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Accounting Standard Precision
In recent years, joint task forces comprised of members of the FASB and IASB
have released updated standards on revenue recognition and leases, which aim to bridge
the fundamental differences in the accounting standards of U.S. GAAP and IFRS related
to revenue recognition. These revised standards have spurred discussion regarding a
potential migration of U.S. GAAP towards a standard system that is comprised of less
precise accounting standards, and the potential benefits and drawbacks of such conversion.
The SEC summarized the main issues with such conversion as follows:
Commenters who preferred IFRS’s approach asserted that it is less complex than
U.S. GAAP and allows companies to capture the substance of transactions. On the
other hand, commenters who preferred U.S. GAAP’s approach expressed that IFRS
relies too much on management discretion, thereby increasing the potential for
opportunistic accounting; creating challenges for auditors… and reducing
comparability. (SEC 2010)
This statement makes reference to the important role that professional judgment
plays in the application of less precise standards, which may be simultaneously the greatest
benefit and largest drawback to conversion. The latitude in selecting an accounting
treatment in less precise standards provides the best opportunity for a transaction to be
recorded in a manner which reflects its underlying economic substance (SEC 2003).
However, the increased role of judgment is also cited as a weakness of less precise
standards. Former SEC Chief Accountant Robert Herdman noted that a less precise
approach “requires greater discipline by the corporate community, the accounting
profession, private sector standard-setting bodies, and, indeed, the SEC staff” to maintain
consistency (Herdman, 2002). Moreover, opponents of less precise standards suggest that
external regulators and auditors may face greater opposition from financial statement
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preparers choosing an aggressive treatment under less precise standards, since less precise
standards makes more treatment options defensible based on how judgment is applied by
different individuals (Maines et al. 2003; Hail, Luez & Wysocki 2010; Wüstemann and
Wüstemann 2010; Backof, Bamber & Carpenter 2016).
Several studies on accounting standard precision examine factors which affect a
financial statement preparers reporting decision: incentives to report aggressively (Psaros
and Trotman 2004), auditor mindset (Jamal and Tan 2010), and audit committee strength
(Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis 2011). Psaros and Trotman (2004) use a consolidated
accounting case where incentives exist for management not to consolidate. They find that
marginally more participants elect not to consolidate when presented with more precise
standards. Jamal and Tan (2010) examine the impact of auditor mindset and standard
precision on managers’ aggressive reporting. They find that less precise standards are
associated with less aggressive reporting when the auditor has a principles-oriented
mindset. Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) find that participants applying a less
precise standard are significantly less likely to report aggressively than those applying a
more precise standard. They find that audit committee strength is a significantly associated
with less aggressive financial reporting under more precise standards, but do not find a
statistically significant relationship under less precise standards. Overall, these studies
provide support for the general notion that less precise standards are associated with less
aggressive financial reporting by financial statement preparers.
Standard Precision and Auditor Constraint of Aggressive Financial Reporting
A recent study surveyed experienced auditors to assess auditor’s perceptions of the
impact of removing more precise standards from current guidance in ten different
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accounting contexts (McEnroe and Sullivan 2012). While the authors theorized that
auditors may exhibit a preference for less precise standards due to the flexibility it provides
to ensure financial statements are not misleading, their results support the opposite. Rather,
they find that auditors preferred inclusion of more precise standards in nearly all contexts.
Specifically, auditors perceive that transitioning to less precise standards will hinder
comparability across firms, verifiability, and will limit the ability of financial information
to provide relevant information and a faithful representation of the underlying economic
event.
A recent study provides empirical support for the findings of McEnroe and Sullivan
(2012). Backof, Bamber and Carpenter (2016) examine auditor application of more precise
or less precise accounting standards and the effect of judgment frameworks on auditor
constraint of aggressive financial reporting. They find that auditors are less likely to
constrain aggressive financial reporting by management under less precise standards, and
that the use of a judgment framework increases auditor constraint of aggressive financial
reporting. The findings are attributed to the perception of a reduced ability to resolve
conflicts with management when auditors are applying less precise standards. The authors
find that the relationship between less precise accounting standards and the reduction in
the ability to constrain aggressive financial reporting under less precise standards is due to
auditor perceptions of a loss of power in their ability to challenge aggressive financial
reporting decisions by management. This perspective is supported by a stream of research
which shows that, when incentives are present, auditors permit aggressive reporting
through interpretation of less precise standards (Hackenbrack and Nelson 2006; Nelson,
Elliott & Tarpley 2002; Kadous, Kennedy & Peecher 2003).
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Notably, the Backof, Bamber and Carpenter (2016) study uses audit partners and
managers as participants. It is important to consider whether the observed relationship
between less precise standards and decreased auditor constraint of aggressive financial
reporting due to a perceived loss of power to challenge management is an effect that may
be limited to upper-level auditors. Staff auditors may not consider a potential loss in
negotiation power when applying less precise standards, as challenging management’s
selection of treatments is a task that would likely not be performed until reaching the level
of audit manager (Abdolmohammadi 1999). As the review of leases is an audit task
generally performed by staff auditors (Abdolmohammadi 1999), it is important to consider
whether these findings will hold when less experienced auditors are performing the same
audit procedure.
Two studies present evidence that less precise standards are associated with better
auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting. Cohen et al. (2013) examine the effect
of financial regulatory regime strength along with standard precision on auditor constraint
of aggressive financial reporting. They find that auditors are more likely to constrain
aggressive financial reporting by management under less precise standards, under both
weaker and stronger financial regulatory regimes. Peytcheva, Wright and Majoor (2013)
develop and test a theoretical model which explains the relationship between accounting
standard precision and auditor cognitive processing and information search. Specifically,
their model explains the relationship between standard precision, auditor epistemic
motivation and the amount of audit evidence demanded, which influences audit
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conclusions.24 The results reveal that less precise standards are associated with higher
process accountability, which influences the extent of auditor epistemic motivation, which
then affects the amount of evidence demanded by the auditor. Taken together, these studies
provide compelling evidence which suggests that auditors are more likely to constrain
aggressive financial reporting when evaluating evidence relative to less precise accounting
standards. These findings inform hypothesis one.
Hypothesis 1: Staff auditors applying less precise (more precise)
accounting standards will be more likely (less likely) to constrain
management’s aggressive financial reporting.
Auditor Susceptibility to Client Influence
A popular criticism of less precise standards is that transitioning to less precise
standards will decrease the auditor’s ability to challenge management’s selection of
preferential accounting treatments (Gibbons, Salterio & Webb 2001).

The SEC

acknowledges this concern:
The international standards (IFRS) are widely viewed as less specific and providing
less prescriptive guidance than U.S. GAAP (i.e., IFRS are more principles-based),
as well as more subjective primarily due to more use of fair value measurements.
The downgrading of verifiability as a key concept guiding accounting standard
setting and the resulting focus on fair value measurement significantly impairs the
ability of an auditor to limit opportunistic actions of management and improve
financial reporting (SEC 2010).
A recent study finds evidence that supports this concern. Backof, Bamber and Carpenter
(2016) find that auditors perceive a loss of power to challenge aggressive financial
reporting when auditing the application of less precise standards, and that less precise

24

Audit Standard 15 requires the auditor to gather sufficient, appropriate evidence to support his or her
conclusion. Thus, the auditor’s information search and evidence gathering process directly affects the
quality of the audit.
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standards are associated with less auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting. This
suggests that auditors are more likely to accept the financial reporting decisions made by
management when applying less precise standards.
It is also possible that auditors will be influenced by having knowledge of
management’s judgments, and that this will increase the likelihood that the auditor accepts
management’s aggressive financial reporting decisions. While the expectation is that
auditors perform all of their work independent of the client, an extensive body of literature
shows that auditors are unable to disregard knowledge of management’s assessment and
that such knowledge biases auditor judgment. If management provided information
includes an aggressive financial reporting decision, any judgment bias which reduces the
likelihood that the auditor will challenge the aggressive decision may pose a threat to audit
quality. It is important to understand whether auditors are more susceptible to knowledge
bias when evaluating the application of either more precise or less precise accounting
standards.
Auditors are expected to assess whether the financial statements of the client
represent the underlying economic reality of the client’s financial position. This involves
performing a systematic analysis of financial information which is generated by the client
during the course of their operations. Given that an auditor is expected to be an objective
third-party evaluator, understanding whether auditors are susceptible to biases is of great
importance. An auditor is generally provided with summary financial information prepared
by the management of the audit client. The auditor then has the responsibility to obtain
evidence in order to assess whether the information provided by the client is fairly stated
in accordance with relevant accounting standards. In this case, the audit client’s
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management has the benefit of acting as the “first mover” on information, where they are
the first party to process, prepare, and conclude on financial statement information. The
auditor becomes the “second mover,” whereby the auditor is processing information with
knowledge of the conclusions reached by management (Earley, Hoffman & Joe 2008).
Given that the auditor is using the information provided by management as a starting point
and gathering evidence to either support (or refute) the information, this leaves the auditor
highly susceptible to allowing management’s information to influence their own
conclusions (McDaniel and Kinney 1995; Kennedy 1995).
Prior literature finds that auditors are unable to disregard management provided
information in forming their own audit judgments (Kinney and Ueker 1982; Biggs and
Wild 1985; Heintz and White 1989; McDaniel and Kinney 1995). A more recent study,
Earley, Hoffman and Joe (2008) extend these findings to the internal control context. The
study examines the effects of knowledge bias on auditors’ judgments of the severity of
identified internal control deficiencies. They find that auditors are more likely to agree with
the severity classification of management when provided with management’s classification
of the deficiency prior to making their own classification of the severity.
Due to the increased role of judgment required to audit of the application of less
precise standards, auditors may become increasingly susceptible to the effects of
knowledge bias. This may result in audit judgments which are more consistent with the
financial reporting decisions made by management. Accordingly, I hypothesize that auditor
judgment of the appropriate accounting treatment will be influenced by management’s own
assessment to a greater extent when auditors are evaluating the evidence relative to less
precise standards.
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Hypothesis 2: Auditor assessment of the appropriate lease classification
will be influenced to a greater extent by management’s classification when
the auditor is relying on less precise standards relative to when relying on
more precise standards.
Accounting Standard Precision and Audit Judgment Variability
The FASB defines comparability as “the qualitative characteristic that enables users
to identify and understand similarities in and differences among items” (FASB 2010) and
is the primary reason for the development of accounting standards (FASB 1980).
Opponents of transitioning GAAP towards a more principles-based standards system argue
that less precise accounting standards present a significant threat to the comparability of
financial statements at two points in the reporting process. First, less precise standards are
said to increase the role of judgment in the reporting process, and the increased latitude
will allow management to select preferential accounting treatments.25 Secondly, auditing
the application of less precise standards will require greater application of auditor
judgment, which will introduce greater variability in auditing conclusions. The SEC echoed
this concern:
IFRS’s less detailed and prescriptive guidance, coupled with any diversity of
perspectives amongst issuers, auditors, and regulators on a global basis may
affect the comparability of financial statements prepared under IFRS. For
example, in the auditing context, commenters raised concerns regarding the
possibility that each audit firm will develop its own interpretations of IFRS,
resulting in reduced comparability across companies using different auditors.
(SEC 2010)

25

To date, there is no empirical support for this concern. Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) finds that
less precise standards are associated with greater comparability in financial statement preparers’ decisions.
Hunter (2017) finds that there is no difference in the variability of decisions reached under either standard
precision.
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Given the importance of comparability in the audit process, it is important to consider how
the precision of accounting standards may influence the comparability of audit judgment.
Most theories of rational choice commonly used to explain judgment decision
making assume that an equivalent process will be used by different individuals to yield the
same decision outcome (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Yet, there is substantial evidence
which demonstrates that under uncertainty, the systematic ordering of preferences may
differ considerably from the preferences dictated by models of rational choice (Tversky,
Slovic & Kahneman1990). This phenomenon is referred to as procedural variance, where
the decision process itself varies based on task attributes. Specifically, two distinct task
types are introduced: matching and choice26. In a choice task, the individual is presented
with a complete set of information and must then weight the attributes and choose the
superior alternative. It is important to note that in a choice task, the individual will have all
relevant information to make a decision, and still need to apply judgment in order to reach
a conclusion. In contrast, in a matching task, the individual does not have the complete set
of information and must calculate the appropriate value, which can then serve as the basis
for the decision process. Matching tasks require computation of attribute values, which
then require comparison to a reference point to determine the appropriate decision. This

26
Tversky, Sattath and Slovic (1988) illustrate the difference between a choice and matching task using the
following example: Approximately 600 people are killed each year in Israel in traffic accidents. The
government is considering implementing two programs to reduce the number of casualties. Program A is
expected to lead to 570 casualties and cost $12 million, while Program B is expected to lead to 500
casualties and cost $X. In a matching task, the individual is asked to provide an estimate of X that makes
the programs equivalent. The individual need only compute the cost of saving one life in Program A
($400,000) and then multiple the cost per life saved in Program A by number of lives saved in Program B
to determine the value which makes the programs equivalent ($40,000,000). The only variability in
responses would be due to computational errors. Rather, in a choice task, the individual is provided with
the cost of Program B ($55 million) and must determine whether saving 70 additional lives is worth the
additional $43 million. This requires the individual to weigh the financial cost and the value placed upon
saving a human life. There will be significant more variability in decisions made under the choice task
based on how the decision maker weighs variables according to their personal preferences.
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contrasts with choice tasks, in that once the individual has computed all relevant
information, and compared information to the reference point, there is no need to apply
judgment.
The discussion of procedural variance is notable to the discussion on standard
precision, given that a decision context under more precise standards resembles a
quantitative decision, more akin to a matching task. In contrast, the decision context under
less precise standards requires qualitative judgment, which is a choice task.27
In a more precise matching task, an auditor needs to calculate the relevant value
based on client-provided information, and compare the calculated value to the reference.28
The auditor does not need to exercise a significant amount of judgment to determine the
appropriate classification. In contrast, in a choice task with less precise standards, an
auditor must gather all relevant information, and then weigh the importance of each piece
of information and apply professional judgment to reach their conclusion. The types of
information which may be considered as part of that process includes the intent of
management with respect to the transaction, the conclusion reached by management for the
specific transaction, as well as the incentives of management which may impact their
reporting decisions.29 How this information is weighed is a matter of professional

27
The distinction is best illustrated by the lease classification decision under Accounting Standards
Codification (ASC) 840 - Accounting for Leases relative to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 17 –
Leases. Under SFAS 13, an auditor needs to compare the lease specifics to a series of quantitative
thresholds (e.g. if the lease term is greater than 75% of the economic useful life of the asset it shall be
classified as a capital lease). In contrast, under IAS 17, an auditor must exercise significantly more
judgment to determine whether the lease meets the qualitative guidance of the standard (e.g. if the lease
term is for the major part of the economic useful life of the asset it shall be classified as a capital lease).
28
It should be noted that the lease term includes any period covered by a bargain renewal option (the option
to renew the lease at significantly less than fair market value). “Significantly less than fair market value” is
considered to be less than 90% of fair market value.
29
Anderson, Kadous and Koonce (2004) examine the role of management’s incentives and the
quantification of information on auditor judgments. They find that management’s incentives alone
influences auditors’ assessments of the persuasiveness of management’s explanations.
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judgment, and may differ from auditor to auditor. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect
to see a greater degree of variability in the decisions reached by auditors under less precise
standards relative to more precise standards.
Hypothesis 3: Less precise standards (more precise standards) will be
associated with greater (less) variability in auditor judgment.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Participants in the study are 228 undergraduate and graduate accounting students
at a private business university. Participants indicated they had completed an average of
8.45 accounting courses, 1.13 auditing courses, and 65% of participants indicated that they
were graduate students. At the time that the study was conducted, 47% of participants had
completed an auditing internship. There is no difference in the level of experience across
the treatment conditions, and the participants are randomly assigned to treatment
conditions (described below).
Accounting students are an appropriate proxy for investigating the judgment of staff
auditors in this particular setting for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, approximately
47% of the students had already completed an auditing internship where they received firm
sponsored training and on-the-job experience relating to performing substantive testing
procedures and evidence evaluation for tasks commonly assigned to entry-level auditors.
Based on discussions with audit firm personnel at the partner and manager level at various
Big 4 firms, the level of difficulty of the task is well-aligned for entry-level staff auditors.
Further, the review of lease contracts is an appropriate task for entry-level staff auditors
(Abdolmohammadi 1999). The concepts of auditor judgment and evidence evaluation are
discussed by faculty during participants’ coursework. Thus, these participants have
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approximately the level of knowledge and experience that would be expected of an entrylevel auditor.
Second, prior researchers conclude that students can be appropriate surrogates for
auditors in decision-making studies (Ashton and Kramer 1980; Peecher and Solomon
2001; Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson 2002). As this experiment focuses specifically on the
judgments of staff auditors, accounting students are an acceptable proxy to represent newly
hired audit professionals for the purposes of this experiment.
Design
To examine the issue of how standard precision influences auditor judgment, I
conduct a 2 x 3 between-subjects experiment where I manipulate standard precision at two
levels (more precise and less precise) and knowledge of client classification at three levels
(no knowledge, classification set 1, classification set 2). The experiment asks the
participants to assume the role of a staff auditor who has been assigned to participate in the
audit of a fictitious company. The participant is told that they have been assigned to audit
the classification of leases which the company entered into during the year.
The first variable STANDARD_PRECISION is manipulated at two levels: more
precise standard and less precise standard. Participants in the more precise standard
condition are provided with more precise lease capitalization criteria from ASC 840 Leases
(i.e. lease must be classified as a capital lease if the lease term is equal to 75% or more of
the expected economic useful life of the asset). Participants in the less precise standard
condition are provided with less precise lease capitalization criteria from IAS 17 –
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Accounting for Lease (i.e. lease must be classified as a capital lease if the lease term is for
the major part of the expected economic useful life of the asset).30
The second variable of interest KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION
is manipulated at three levels: no classification provided, classifications set 1 provided, and
classification set 2 provided. In the no classification provided conditions, participants are
provided the lease information for a series of leases, where the client’s classification of the
lease is omitted. In the two treatment conditions which provide participants with the
client’s lease classification, half of the participants receive a more aggressive lease
classification (i.e. the lease is classified as an operating lease) and half receive a more
conservative lease classification (i.e. the lease is classified as a capital lease). The treatment
conditions were labeled as “Classification Set 1” and “Classification Set 2” in order to
distinguish which classification sets were presented to participants for each lease. A design
of this variable is presented in Table 3.1.
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Each participant receives identical case materials, except for the modifications due
to the experimental manipulations described above. The full research instrument is
included in the appendix. Participants are told that they are to assume the role of the staff
auditor of a fictitious company, ABC Company, and that they have been assigned to audit
the classification of leases by their audit supervisor. Participants are then provided with
lease classification criteria, receiving either the more precise or the less precise standard

30

It should be noted that a joint task force of the FASB and IASB recently issued revised standards for
accounting for leases (FASB issued February 25, 2016 and IASB issued January 13, 2016). The new
standards require all leases which do not meet the requirement of short-term leases (term less than 12months) be recognized on the balance sheet of the lessee. While the revised standards do substantially
change the lease classification criteria, I do not believe this impacts the generalizability of the study as I am
primarily interested in the effect of standard precision rather than the application of a particular accounting
standard.
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precision manipulation. Each participant is then told that for their assessment of the client’s
classification of the lease, they are to assume that the only relevant criterion is the ratio of
the lease term to the expected economic useful life of the leased asset. Participants are
provided with the following definitions, which are consistent with both ASC 840 and IAS
17:
“Lease term” is defined as the fixed non-cancelable term of the lease plus
all periods covered by bargain renewal options.
“Bargain renewal options” allow the lessee to renew the lease for a rental
sufficiently lower than the fair rental of the property such that exercise of
the option appears, at the inception of the lease, to be reasonably assured.
For each of the four leases included in the task, participants are provided with the
lease information for the selected lease, and the knowledge of client classification
manipulation (either not provided, classification set 1 or classification set 2). Each lease is
designed to be near the margin of a capital or operating lease, based on the term of the lease
and bargain renewal option relative to the economic useful life of the underlying asset.
Each lease decision provides the participant with the non-cancelable lease term, as well as
the option to renew the lease for an additional term. The participant must first judge
whether the rate for the additional year represents a bargain renewal option to determine if
the additional year should be included in the lease term, and then judge whether the lease
terms meets the criteria for capitalization provided by the lease standard.
Participants are also provided a summary of the financial impact of each of the two
accounting treatments. The summary demonstrates that the capitalization of the lease
provides less favorable financial results relative to classifying the lease as an operating
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lease. Thus, the auditor is aware that the client has an incentive to record the lease as an
operating lease.
Participants are then asked to assess the appropriate classification of each lease on
a 1-10 Likert-type scale where 1 represents “Definitely classify as an operating lease” and
10 represents “Definitely classify as a capital lease. The participant’s assessment of how
he

or

she

would

likely

classify

each

lease

is

the

dependent

variable

(ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION).

IV. RESULTS
The debriefing questions included a manipulation check to ensure that participants
attenuated to the standard precision manipulation. The manipulation check asked
participants to indicate whether the criterion for classifying leases as a capital lease was
that the lease term is equal to 75% or more of the economic useful life of the asset, or for
the major part of the economic useful life of the asset. Results indicate that 87 participants
either failed to correctly identify the lease criterion which had been provided or did not
successfully complete the research instrument. There was no difference in accuracy
between treatment groups. Participants who failed to attenuate to the standard precision
manipulation or fully complete the instrument were removed from further analysis,
resulting in a final sample of 141 participants.
To examine how participants responded to each individual lease, I perform a 2 X 3
X

4

repeated

measures

ANOVA.

The

first

between-subjects

variable,

STANDARD_PRECISION, has two levels (less precise accounting standard and more
precise

accounting

standard)

and

the

second

between

subjects

variable,

KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION, has three levels (no classification
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provided, classification set 1, and classification set 2). The within-participants variable,
LEASE, is an indicator variable representing each of the four leases assessed (leases one
through four). The analysis reveals there is a significant main effect of LEASE (F = 4.574,
p < .05), as well as a significant interaction between LEASE and STANDARD_PRECISION
(F = 9.883,

p < .01). The results are presented in Table 3.2.
[INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

This suggests that there is a significant difference in how participants are
interpreting each of the four leases. This finding is consistent with expectations, given that
the leases differed in both the ratio of the lease term to economic useful life and the
embedded information about management’s classification of the lease. Therefore, to
address the specific hypotheses regarding the effects of standard precision, I conduct
separate tests, described below, for each of the leases. For two of the leases, it is evident
that participants did not respond to the manipulations and that their lease classification is
based on case information that was not measured by the research instrument, due to low
adjusted R-squared values (adjusted R-squared = 0.000 and -0.024, respectively) and
insignificant independent variables (all p-values > .1). Therefore, I consider these cases to
be a failed manipulation and exclude them from further analysis. The remaining analysis
will focus on leases one and two.
Standard Precision and Auditor Constraint of Aggressive Financial Reporting
Hypothesis one predicts that auditors will better constrain aggressive financial
reporting when auditing the application of less precise standards. The results, presented in
Table 3.3 Panels C and D, provide support for hypothesis one. The results reveal a
significant

relationship

between
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STANDARD_PRECISION

and

ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION. Specifically, the results reveal that for
lease one, auditors are more likely to conclude that the appropriate lease classification is
an operating lease (which is the client-preferred treatment) when evaluating evidence under
more precise accounting standards (mean = 4.76) relative to auditing the application of less
precise accounting standards (mean = 6.83, F = 19.769, p < .01). The pattern of findings
is consistent for lease two (more precise mean = 4.55, less precise mean = 6.60, F = 19.989,
p < .01). Thus, hypothesis one is supported. This suggests that staff auditors may better
constrain management aggressive financial reporting when auditing the application of less
precise accounting standards.
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
Standard Precision and Auditor Susceptibility to Client Influence
The second hypothesis examines whether auditor susceptibility to influence by the
client differs by standard precision. Hypothesis two predicts that auditors will be more
greatly influenced by management’s classification of the leases when auditing the
application of less precise accounting standards. Hypothesis two is tested using a two-way
MANOVA

where

the

independent

variables

are

KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION and STANDARD_PRECISION and the
dependent variable is ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION for each lease. The
findings, shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, reveal no significant main effect of knowledge of
management’s classification on auditor assessment of the appropriate lease classification
in either lease one or two (p-value = 0.488 and 0.301 respectively). Additionally, there is
no significant interactive effect of KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION and
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STANDARD_PRECISION on auditor assessment of the appropriate lease classification for
either lease one or two (p-value = 0.148 and 0.557 respectively).
[INSERT TABLES 3.4 AND 3.5 ABOUT HERE]
The lack of significant findings in support of hypothesis two has important
implications for the debate on standard precision. A common criticism of less precise
standards is that auditors will have less power to challenge the accounting treatment
selection of management. Backof, Bamber and Carpenter (2016) reveal that auditors
perceive that a transition to less precise standards would lessen the power that auditors
have to challenge management on their selection of aggressive accounting positions. The
findings reveal that there is no significant difference in auditor constraint of aggressive
financial reporting between auditors who are aware that management has taken an
aggressive position, a conservative position, or importantly, those who are unaware of
management’s classification. There was no observed difference in auditor assessment of
the appropriate classification between the control condition, where the participants had no
knowledge of how management classified the lease, and those receiving either
management’s conservative or aggressive classification of the lease. This suggests that
while there are still differences in auditor assessment of the appropriate lease classification
due to standard precision, these differences are not attributable to an increase in
management’s influence on auditor judgment. This finding may help to alleviate concerns
that auditors will be less inclined to challenge management’s aggressive financial reporting
under less precise standards.
Standard Precision and Variability in Auditor Judgment
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Hypotheses three investigates whether auditor assessments vary to a greater extent
when the auditor is evaluating evidence relative to differently precise accounting standards.
To address this hypothesis, I conduct a one-way MANOVA along with Levene’s test of
equality of variances where the independent variable is STANDARD_PRECISION, which
is manipulated at two levels (more precise and less precise), and the dependent variables
are the assessments of the appropriate lease classification for both leases one and two
(ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION). The results of the analysis are presented
in Table 3.6. The results reveal that there is significantly greater variability in the
assessment of the appropriate assessment of lease classification when applying more
precise standards for both lease one (F-value = 2.904, p < 0.1) and least two (F-value =
6.091, p < 0.05). This finding suggests that there is little support for the concern that
auditing the application of less precise accounting standards will results in greater
variability in auditor judgments. Rather, the findings suggest that auditor’ assessments
actually vary to a greater extent when relying on more precise standards.
[INSERT TABLE 3.6 ABOUT HERE]
This finding addresses a common concern regarding less precise accounting
standards. Opponents of less precise accounting standards argue that auditor judgment will
vary to a greater extent when applying less precise standards. This argument has important
implications for audit quality, as an important element of audit judgment is that it is
performed to enable another competent auditor to review the same information and deem
the conclusion reasonable. I do not find evidence to support this concern. In fact, the results
suggest that auditor judgments are actually more consistent when applying less precise
standards.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the role of standard precision in auditor constraint of
aggressive financial reporting. This study is motivated by concerns that audit quality will
suffer due to the increased role of judgment in the audit process when applying less precise
accounting standards. As the FASB has recently issued two revised accounting standards
which are less precise in nature relative to the rules-based standards that previously
characterized U.S. GAAP, this issue is incredibly important. To address this issue, I
examine the effect of standard precision on auditor constraint of aggressive financial
reporting, as well as investigate two common criticisms of less precise accounting
standards including variability in auditor judgment and judgment.
Consistent with my expectations, I find that staff auditors (proxied for by
undergraduate and graduate accounting students) are more likely to constrain aggressive
financial reporting by management under less precise accounting standards. These findings
support the notion that migrating U.S. GAAP to a less precise standard system may result
in better auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting by management. Further, I find
no evidence that there will be an increase in the variability of auditor judgment when
applying less precise standards. Rather, I find evidence showing that auditor judgments
vary to a lesser extent when applying less precise standards. Importantly, I also find that
staff auditors applying less precise standards are no more influenced by the classification
of management than those applying more precise accounting standards.
This finding has important implications for the discourse on standard precision. To
understand the implications, it is important to consider these findings relative to those of
Backof, Bamber and Carpenter (2016), which examines the same issue also using a
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modified version of the Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) lease classification case
and measures the same dependent variable. Importantly, their study participants are audit
partners and managers. Their findings differ from the present study in that they find that
auditors better constrain management’s aggressive financial reporting when applying more
precise standards. Through measures captured during their debriefing analysis, they find
that the observed relationship between less precise standards and a reduction in auditor
constraint of aggressive financial reporting is attributable to the perception of a loss of
power to challenge management’s selection of an aggressive classification when auditing
the application of less precise standards.
It is possible that the discrepancy in findings is attributable to the level of audit
experience of study participants. Entry-level staff auditors may be unlikely to consider a
potential loss in negotiation power when applying less precise standards, as challenging
the accounting treatments chosen by the client is a task suited to much more experienced
auditors (Abdolmohammadi 1999). Absent concerns about the loss of power when
applying less precise standards, it is unclear whether the relationship between standard
precision and auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting will hold. I present
evidence showing that for staff auditors, less precise standards are associated with greater
auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting. This suggests that the effects of
standard precision on auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting may differ with
auditor experience level.
This study makes several important contributions to both research and practice. I
find evidence that the proposed migration of U.S. GAAP towards a global set of accounting
standards will not necessarily result in less auditor constraint of attempts to report
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aggressively by management. Further, this study aims to address two important concerns
regarding the proposed migration from a more precise standard system to a less precise
standard system (SEC 2010). Contrary to concerns that less precise standards will lead to
greater variability in audit judgments, I find evidence that there is less variability in auditor
judgment when auditing the application of less precise standards. Further, opponents of the
transition argue that auditors will lose the ability to challenge management’s selection of
aggressive treatments under less precise standards (SEC 2010), and prior literature finds
that expert auditors perceive this to be the case (Backof, Bamber & Carpenter 2016). I find
no evidence to suggest that staff auditors are more likely to accept the classification
decisions of management under less precise standards. This study provides important
insights for academics, auditors, and regulators as they further explore the implications of
potential standard migration.
It is important to note that the case used in the study focuses on a specific context
(lease classification), which has been revised by the joint task force of the FASB and IASB.
To broaden the generalizability of my findings, future research could examine standard
precision using alternative settings. Also, the use of accounting students as a proxy for
entry-level auditors does not consider how firm training on audit judgment process may
impact the judgment process of staff auditors. Further, it has been suggested that a
migration to less precise standards would require a shift in audit planning and task
delegation requiring more experienced auditors to evaluate areas subject to less precise
standards, due to the greater involvement of judgment. Therefore, future research could
examine auditor judgment at varying levels throughout the firm to better understand how
judgment differs by staff level, and the effect this has on auditor performance.
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FIGURE 1.1
Visual Fit of Lease Classification Decision Planned Contrast

______________________________
Figure Notes: The independent variable INCENTIVE_HORIZON is an indicator variable where zero
represents the short-term treatment condition, and one represents the long-term treatment condition. The
variable STANDARD_PRECISION is an indicator variable where zero represents the more precise
treatment condition, and one represents the less precise treatment condition. The dependent variable is
LEASE_CLASSIFICATION. This figure presents the planned contrast for financial statement preparers’
lease classification decision. Specifically, when the INCENTIVE_HORIZON is short-term (long-term),
financial statement preparers will be less likely (more likely) to make an aggressive financial reporting
decision when STANDARD_PRECISION is less precise than will preparers applying a more precise
standard. The planned contrast weights are: Cell 0 (+1), Cell 1 (-1), Cell 2 (-1), Cell 3 (+1). Results are
presented in Table 1.
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FIGURE 2.1
Impact of Standard Precision and Decision Processing on Lease Classification
Decision

Figure Notes: Figure one depicts the relationship between standard precision and decision processing
mode.

81

TABLE 1.1
Lease Classification Decision Descriptive Statistics and Results

Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of participants]
INCENTIVE_HORIZON: INCENTIVE_HORIZON:
Short-Term
Long-Term
STANDARD_PRECISION:
6.75
5.00
Less Precise
(3.10)
(3.64)
[38]
[33]
STANDARD_PRECISION:
5.59
6.56
More Precise
(3.55)
(3.46)
[39]
[36]
Column Means
6.16
5.81
(3.36)
(3.61)
[77]
[69]

Row
Means
5.93
(3.45)
[71]
6.05
(3.52)
[75]
6.00
(3.47)
[146]

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Factor

df

Mean Square

F-value

p-valuea

INCENTIVE_HORIZON (IH)

1

5.59

0.47

0.493

STANDARD_PRECISION (SP)

1

1.42

0.12

0.729

IH X SP

1

67.03

5.68

0.019

Error

142

11.81
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts
F
H1a and H1b: When the incentive horizon is short-term 5.67
(long-term), financial statement preparers will be less
likely (more likely) to make an aggressive financial
reporting decision when applying less precise
accounting than will preparers applying a more precise
standard

p-value
0.018**

______________________________
Table Notes: This table presents the results for testing of hypotheses 1a and 1b for the full sample.
a

Reported p-values are two-tailed.

*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 1.2
Lease Classification Decision Descriptive Statistics and Results
Analysis based on Perception of “For the Major Part of”

Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of participants]
INCENTIVE_HORIZON:
Short-Term

STANDARD_PRECISION:
Less Precise
STANDARD_PRECISION:
More Precise

Column Means

INCENTIVE_HORIZON:
Long-Term

6.91
(3.15)
[17]
5.59
(3.55)
[39]
5.99
(3.46)
[56]

5.11
(3.62)
[9]
6.56
(3.46)
[36]
6.27
(3.50)
[45]

Row
Means

6.288
(3.37)
[26]
6.05
(3.52)
[75]
6.11
(3.46)
[101]

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Factor

df

Mean Square F-value

p-valuea

INCENTIVE_HORIZON (IH)

1

3.12

0.260

0.611

STANDARD_PRECISION (SP)

1

0.07

0.006

0.941

IH X SP

1

34.27

2.860

0.094

Error

97

11.98
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Panel C: Planned Contrasts
F
H1a and H1b: When the incentive horizon is short-term 2.860
(long-term), financial statement preparers will be less
likely (more likely) to make an aggressive financial
reporting decision when applying less precise
accounting than will preparers applying a more precise
standard

p-value
0.094*

Table Notes: This table presents the results for testing of hypotheses 1a and 1b for restricted sample. For
the above analyses, the sample is restricted to include only participants in the less precise
STANDARD_PRECISION condition who indicated that their interpretation of the phrase “for the major part
of” refers to a percentage within the relevant decision range of 70 – 80%.
a

Reported p-values are two-tailed.

*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 1.3
Debriefing Analysis

Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation)

Debriefing
Item

INCENTIVE_HORIZON
Short-Term
Less
More
Total
Precise
Precise

INCENTIVE_HORIZON
Long-Term
Less
More
Total
Precise
Precise

Regulator
SecondGuessing

5.43
(3.25)

5.69
(3.25)

5.57
(3.23)

5.06
(2.75)

5.08
(3.08)

5.07
(2.91)

Economic
Substance

7.65
(2.18)

7.67
(2.37)

7.66
(2.26)

6.58
(2.82)

7.39
(2.41)

7.00
(2.62)

Negative
Consequences
from CEO

3.50
(2.49)

4.49
(3.11)

4.00
(2.85)

4.42
(2.68)

4.72
(3.03)

4.58
(2.85)

Present
Company
Information
Favorably

5.84
(3.02)

6.13
(2.79)

5.99
(2.89)

5.76
(2.91)

6.00
(2.62)

5.88
(2.74)

Table Notes: This table presents the results of our supplemental analyses. The above measures were
captured during experiment debriefing.
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TABLE 2.1
Sample Reduction
STANDARD_PRECISION STANDARD_PRECISION
Less Precise
More Precise
Initial Sample

254

239

Removed due to
Manipulation
Check Failurea

51

69

Sampleb

203

170

Removal of
Participants
Who Indicate
their Perception
of “For the
Major Part of”
Falls Outside of
70-80% Rangec

126

--

Final Sampled

77

170

Total

493

373

247

Table Notes: The table provides information on the sample reduction.
a

Of the 493 study participants, 120 failed to correctly identify which standard precision criteria they had
been provided on which to base their lease classification. These participants were removed from further
analysis.
b
This sample is used for the initial testing of hypothesis one and hypothesis two (presented in Table 2).
c
It is important to ensure that the less precise standard treatment condition does not alter the decision
context of the participant. In order to do so, participants who indicated that their interpretation of the phrase
“for the major part of” falls outside of the relevant decision range of 70 – 80% are removed from the
analysis.
d This sample is used for additional testing of hypothesis one (presented in Table 3).
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TABLE 2.2
Lease Classification Decision Descriptive Statistics and Results
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of participants]
DECISION_PROCESSING_MODE
Deliberative
Intuitive
Row Means
STANDARD_PRECISION
Less Precise

5.46
(2.911)
[100]

6.19
(2.987)
[103]

5.83
(2.965)
[203]

STANDARD_PRECISION
More Precise

5.18
(3.172)
[88]

5.59
(3.031)
[82]

5.38
(3.102)
[170]

Column Means

5.33
(3.031)
[188]

5.92
(3.014)
[185]

5.62
(3.033)
[373]

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Factor
STANDARD_PRECISION (SP)
DECISION_PROCESSING_MODE (DP)
DP X SP
Error
R-Squared = 0.016

df
1
1
1
372

Mean
Square
18.183
29.917
2.526
9.127

F-value
1.992
3.278
.277

p-valuea
0.159
0.071*
0.599

Table Notes: The table presents the results of a 2 X 2 ANOVA designed to test my
hypotheses.
a
Reported p-values are two-tailed.
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 2.3
Standard Precision Comparison of Means
Sample reduced to include only those in the less precise condition who interpret the
phrase “for the major part of” to be within the relevant range of 70-80%

Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of participants]
LEASE_CLASSIFICATION
STANDARD_PRECISION 6.31
Less Precise
(2.862)
[77]
STANDARD_PRECISION 5.38
More Precise
(3.102)
[170]
Total

5.67
(3.053)
[247]

Panel B: Kruskal-Wallis H Test Results
Factor

Chi-Square

STANDARD_PRECISION (SP) 3.657

df

Asymp. Sig.

1

.056*

Table Notes: This table presents the results for testing of hypothesis one for the restricted sample. For the
above analyses, the sample is restricted to include only participants in the less precise
STANDARD_PRECISION condition who indicated that their interpretation of the phrase “for the major part
of” refers to a percentage within the relevant decision range of 70 – 80%. Due to the unbalanced cell sizes,
a non-parametric test is required to test the difference in cell means.
a

Reported p-values are two-tailed.

*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 2.4
Decision Processing Mode Comparison of Means

Panel A: Kahneman Score Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of participants]
KAHNEMAN_SCORE
1

2

3

Row
Means

STANDARD_PRECISION
6.49
Less Precise
(2.625)
[70]

5.70
(2.580)
[33]

5.39
(3.350)
[44]

5.45
(3.185)
[56]

5.83
(2.965)
[203]

STANDARD_PRECISION
5.91
More Precise
(2.770)
[45]

6.00
(3.052)
[33]

5.61
(3.166)
[46]

4.17
(3.143)
[46]

5.38
(3.102)
[170]

Column Means

5.85
(2.808)
[66]

5.50
(3.240)
[90]

4.87
(3.214)
[102]

5.62
(3.033)
[373]

0

6.26
(2.686)
[115]

Panel B: Kahneman Score Kruskal-Wallis H Test Results
Factor

Chi-Square

df

Asymp. Sig.

Kahneman Score (KS)

10.932

3

0.012**
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Panel C: REI Score Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of participants]

Low

REI_SCORE
Average
High

Row
Means

STANDARD_PRECISION
Less Precise

4.83
(3.114)
[23]

6.01
(2.888)
[164]

5.44
(3.386)
[16]

5.83
(2.965)
[203]

STANDARD_PRECISION
More Precise

3.67
(3.199)
[27]

5.72
(2.941)
[130]

5.46
(3.526)
[13]

5.38
(3.102)
[170]

Column Means

4.20
(3.182)
[50]

5.88
(2.911)
[294]

5.45
(3.387)
[29]

5.62
(3.033)
[373]

Panel D: REI Score Kruskal-Wallis H Test Results
Factor

Chi-Square

df

Asymp. Sig.

REI_SCORE (REI)

12.187

2

0.002***

Table Notes: This table presents the results for testing of hypothesis two using alternative measures of
decision processing mode. The variables REI_SCORE and KAHNEMAN_SCORE were captured during
experiment debriefing. Due to the unbalanced cell sizes, a non-parametric test is required to test the
difference in cell means.
a

Reported p-values are two-tailed.

*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 3.1
Experiment Design - Influence of Knowledge of Client Classification by Lease

KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION

Classification
Not Provided

Classification Set 1:
Mgmt. Classified
Lease as:

Classification Set 2:
Mgmt. Classified
Lease as:

Lease 1

Not provided

Capital Lease

Operating Lease

Lease 2

Not provided

Operating Lease

Capital Lease

Lease 3

Not provided

Operating Lease

Capital Lease

Lease 4

Not provided

Capital Lease

Operating Lease

Table Notes: This table presents the organization of the variable
KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION. In the classification not provided condition, participants
were not presented with the client’s classification of the lease along with the relevant information. In the
remaining two treatment conditions (classification set 1 and classification set 2), participants were provided
with the client’s classification of the lease (either a capital or operating lease) along with the lease
information.
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TABLE 3.2
Descriptive Statistics and Test of Lease
Panel A: Mean ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION (Standard Deviation) [Number of Participants]

STANDARD_PRECISION: More
Precise
No Class. Mgmt. Mgmt.
Provided Class.
Class.
Total
Set 1
Set 2

Lease 1

3.93
(2.523)
[28]

4.77
(2.808)
[35]

5.68
(2.750)
[25]

4.76
(2.758)
[88]

Lease 2

4.14
(2.902)
[28]

4.20
(2.576)
[35]

5.48
(2.786)
[25]

4.55
(2.775)
[88]

Lease 3

5.89
(2.859)
[28]

6.51
(2.759)
[35]

7.08
(2.216)
[25]

6.48
(2.661)
[88]

Lease 4

5.89
(2.767)
[28]

6.11
(2.774)
[35]

6.40
(2.754)
[25]

6.12
(2.741)
[88]

STANDARD_PRECISION: Less
Precise
No Class. Mg Mgmt.
Provided mt.
Class.
Tota
Clas Set 2
l
s.
Set 1
7.15
6.56
6.71
6.83
(2.477)
(2.5 (2.733) (2.53
[20]
02)
[17]
2)
[16]
[53]
6.60
6.44
6.76
6.60
(2.703)
(2.3 (2.223) (2.42
[20]
94)
[17]
1)
[16]
[53]
7.20
7.06
6.24
6.85
(2.285)
(2.2 (2.562) (2.36
[20]
65)
[17]
5)
[16]
[53]
6.55
6.69
5.82
6.36
(2.685)
(2.4 (2.698) (2.60
[20]
69)
[17]
2)
[16]
[53]
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Case
Total

5.54
(2.850
)
[141]
5.32
(2.822
)
[141]
6.62
(2.551
)
[141]
6.21
(2.683
)
[141]

Panel B: Repeated Measures ANOVA
Factor
df

Mean
Square

f-value

LEASE

1

37.458

4.574

.034**

LEASE X STANDARD_PRECISION (SP)

1

80.938

9.883

.002***

LEASE X
KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASS. (K)

2

7.045

.860

.425

LEASE X SP X K

2

1.740

.212

.809

135

8.190

Error

p-valuea

Table Notes: This table presents the results of a 2 X 3 X 4 repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis
includes the two dependent variables, STANDARD_PRECISION and
KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION, as well as an indicator variable for each of the four
leases (LEASE). This test is designed to examine whether there is a significant effect of lease. The results
reveal a significant effect of the indicator variable, LEASE. This suggests there is a significant difference in
how participants interpret each lease.
a

Reported p-values are two-tailed.

*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 3.3
Auditor Constraint of Aggressive Financial Reporting Descriptive Statistics and
Results

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of
Participants]
ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION
LEASE 1
LEASE 2
STANDARD_PRECISION
More Precise

4.76
(2.758)
[88]

4.55
(2.775)
[88]

STANDARD_PRECISION
Less Precise

6.83
(2.532)
[53]

6.60
(2.421)
[53]

Total

5.54
(2.850)
[141]

5.32
(2.822)
[141]

Panel B: ANOVA Results – Lease 1
Factor

df

Mean Square

F-Value

p-value

STANDARD_PRECISION

1

141.575

19.769

.001***

Error

139

7.162

R-Squared = 0.125 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.118)
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Panel C: ANOVA Results – Lease 2
Factor

df

Mean Square

F-Value

p-value

STANDARD_PRECISION

1

140.141

19.989

.001***

Error

139

7.011

R-Squared = 0.126 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.119)

Table Notes: This table presents results of testing for hypothesis one, which predicts that
less precise accounting standards will be associated with greater auditor constraint of
aggressive financial reporting. The results support hypothesis one.
a
Reported p-values are two-tailed.
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 3.4
Auditor Susceptibility to Client Influence Descriptive Statistics and Results
Lease 1

Panel A: Mean ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION (Standard
Deviation) [Number of Participants]
KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION
No
Classification Classification Classification Row
Provided
Set 1
Set 2
Total
STANDARD_PRECISION
More Precise

3.93
(2.523)
[28]

4.77
(2.808)
[35]

5.68
(2.750)
[25]

4.76
(2.758)
[88]

STANDARD_PRECISION
Less Precise

7.15
(2.477)
[20]

6.56
(2.502)
[16]

6.71
(2.733)
[17]

6.83
(2.532)
[53]

Column Total

5.27
(2.952)
[48]

5.33
(2.819)
[51]

6.10
(2.757)
[42]

5.54
(2.850)
[141]
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Panel B: ANOVA Results
Factor
df

Mean
Square

F-value

p-valuea

STANDARD_PRECISION (SP)

1

132.296

18.771

0.001***

KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASS. (K)

2

5.083

0.721

0.488

SP X K

2

13.676

1.940

0.148

135

7.048

Error

R-Squared = 0.163 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.132)

Table Notes: This table presents results of testing for hypothesis two, which predicts a
disordinal interaction between the precision of accounting standard and knowledge of the
client’s classification on auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting for lease one.
I find no evidence of an interaction.
a
Reported p-values are two-tailed.
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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TABLE 3.5
Auditor Susceptibility to Client Influence Descriptive Statistics and Results
Lease 2

Panel A: Mean ASSESSMENT_OF_LEASE_CLASSIFICATION (Standard
Deviation) [Number of Participants]
KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASSIFICATION
No
Classification Classification Classification
Row
Provided
Set 1
Set 2
Total
STANDARD_PRECISION
More Precise

4.14
(2.902)
[28]

4.20
(2.576)
[35]

5.48
(2.786)
[25]

4.55
(2.775)
[88]

STANDARD_PRECISION
Less Precise

6.60
(2.703)
[20]

6.44
(2.394)
[16]

6.76
(2.223)
[17]

6.60
(2.421)
[53]

Column Total

5.17
(3.048)
[48]

4.90
(2.707)
[51]

6.00
(2.623)
[42]

5.32
(2.822)
[141]
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Panel B: ANOVA Results

Factor

df

Mean
Square

STANDARD_PRECISION (SP)

1

129.722

18.570

0.001***

KNOWLEDGE_OF_CLIENT_CLASS. (K)

2

8.465

1.212

.301

SP X K

2

4.110

.588

.557

135

6.986

Error

F-value

p-valuea

R-Squared = 0.154 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.123)

Table Notes: This table presents results of testing for hypothesis two, which predicts a
disordinal interaction between the precision of accounting standard and knowledge of the
client’s classification on auditor constraint of aggressive financial reporting for lease two.
I find no evidence of an interaction.
a
Reported p-values are two-tailed.
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

100

TABLE 3.6
Variability in Auditor Assessment of Appropriate Lease Classification
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of
Participants]
Lease

STANDARD_PRECISION STANDARD_PRECISION
More Precise
Less Precise

Overall

LEASE 1

4.76
(2.758)
[88]

6.83
(2.532)
[53]

5.54
(2.850)
[141]

LEASE 2

4.55
(2.775)
[88]

6.60
(2.421)
[53]

5.32
(2.822)
[141]

Panel B: Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances
Lease

df

F-value

Significance

LEASE 1

1

2.904

0.091*

LEASE 2

1

6.091

0.015**

Table Notes: This table presents results of testing for hypothesis three, which predicts that
there will be significantly greater variation in auditor assessment of the appropriate lease
classification when applying less precise accounting standards. Contrary to my
expectations, I find evidence that there is significantly greater variation in auditor
assessment of the appropriate lease classification when applying more precise standards.
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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APPENDIX A
Research Instrument

General Instructions
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of the study is to
examine the judgments accountants make about accounting rules. As you are aware,
proper application of accounting rules is important for reliable financial reporting. Your
participation should take approximately 15 minutes.
It is important that you work independently. Furthermore, since there may be
others from your industry in this study at a later date please do not talk with your
colleagues about the study after your participation. If you have any questions, please
contact the lead researcher at <jthibodeau@bentley.edu>. Your participation in this study
is voluntary and sincerely appreciated and by participating you consent to be included in
the study.

Please open envelope #1 and begin the questionnaire.
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Please answer the following questions about you

1) What is your gender?

_____Male

_____Female

2) What is your current job title?
______________________________________________
3) How many years have you worked at your current job? _______ years
4) How many years of professional work experience do you have overall? ______ years
5) Please rate your perceptions about your similarity to your future self. (Recent
research suggests that adulthood is characterized by stability in identity, and the
important characteristics that make you the person you are right now are established
early in life and are fixed by the end of adolescence.) [Recent research suggests that
adulthood is characterized by instability in identity, and the important characteristics
that make you the person you are right now are likely to change radically throughout
your life.]

Think about the important characteristics that make you the person you are now and
circle the one diagram out of the seven below that best reflects your opinion about the
degree of similarity between the person you are now (your current self) and the
person you will be in 10 years (your future self).

The following pages contain information about two accounting issues. Please read
the information carefully because you will be asked to make several decisions based
on this information.
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Information
Assume that you are the controller for ABC Company. There are two important issues
related to R&D spending and leases that require you to make decisions.
Background Information
During the fourth quarter of 2013, the CEO called a meeting to discuss projected
earnings. During the meeting, the CEO mentioned that the currently projected 2013
earnings of $80 million will fall approximately $1 million below the consensus analyst
forecast of earnings, which is $81 million.
In addition, you realize that unless actual 2013 earnings reach $82 million, the CEO will
not receive any bonus for 2013. The CEO’s bonus structure is as follows: bonus of 30%
of base pay if actual 2013 earnings reach the $82 million threshold, and an additional
bonus of 1% of base pay for every $100,000 increment above $82 million. For example,
if actual 2013 earnings reach $82.4 million, the CEO’s bonus would be calculated as
follows: Bonus = 30% of base pay + 4% of base pay.
Executives’ bonuses and a significant portion of their salaries are paid in stock (that can
be sold at any time.)[that cannot be sold for 5 years after receipt.] The CEO currently
holds a large volume of shares that (can be sold at any time)[cannot be sold for several
more years], and these shares represent a meaningful portion of his portfolio.
Issue: R&D Spending
The CEO has indicated that the firm needs to consider strategic spending cuts. The upper
management team has already drastically reduced spending throughout the company, and
it appears that the only remaining place where cuts could be tolerated would be to reduce
research and development (R&D) spending for the remainder of 2013. The board agrees
with this assessment.
The total remaining R&D budget for 2013 is $4 million, and this $4 million expense was
included when calculating the earnings projection of $80 million. You are worried about
potential loss of competitiveness in the near term if 2013 R&D is reduced. You estimate
that for every $100,000 cut in the remaining R&D budget, the ‘worst case’ outcome is a
1% chance of losing ground to competitors. In other words, in the ‘worst case’ a
$100,000 cut to R&D would mean that there is still a 99% chance that no ground will be
lost to competitors. As another example, if R&D is reduced by $1 million, in the worst
possible case there would be a 10% chance of losing ground to competitors and a 90%
chance that no ground will be lost to competitors.
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Issue: Accounting for Leases
Applicable accounting standards require leases to be classified and accounted for as
either capital leases or operating leases. For purposes of this study, there is only one
criterion that you will need to consider in determining whether a lease should be
classified as a capital lease or as an operating lease.
Criterion for Classifying Leases


If at its inception, a lease meets the following criterion, it must be classified as a
capital lease by the lessee:
• The lease term is (equal to 75% or more)[for the major part] of the estimated
economic life of the leased property.
• “Lease term” is defined as the fixed non-cancelable term of the lease plus
all periods covered by bargain renewal options.
• “Bargain renewal options” allow the lessee to renew the lease for a rental
sufficiently lower than the fair rental of the property such that exercise of
the option appears, at the inception of the lease, to be reasonably assured.



If at its inception, a lease does not meet the above criterion, it must be classified
as an operating lease.

The Financial Statement Effects of Leases


Capital leases are accounted for by recording an asset and a liability on the
balance sheet at the present value of the minimum lease payments. Lease
payments are allocated between a reduction of the lease liability and interest
expense. In addition, depreciation expense related to the leased asset is
recognized over the lease term.



Operating leases are accounted for as rental expense on the income statement.
No asset or liability is recorded on the balance sheet.

Equipment Lease Decision
ABC Company has entered into a lease for new equipment that has an estimated
economic life of 10 years. The lease has a fixed non-cancelable term of 5 years, with a
rental of $220,000 payable at the beginning of each month.
At the end of the initial non-cancelable term, the lease agreement provides ABC
Company with the option to renew the lease for an additional 3-year period with the
monthly rental payment to be set at 92% of the fair rental value for the equipment at
that time.
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If classified as a capital lease, the Company will recognize an asset and a liability in
the amount of $11,379,623 at the inception of the lease. In 2013, interest expense and
depreciation expense totaling $3,641,479 will be recognized.
If classified as an operating lease, the Company will recognize rental expense of
$2,640,000 in 2013 and no asset or liability.
Thus, a capital lease will increase liabilities by $11,379,623 and increase 2013
expenses by $1,001,479.
The 2013 earnings projection of $80 million assumed the highest potential expense for
leases (i.e., $3,641,479). Thus, classifying the lease as an operating lease will increase
projected 2013 earnings to $81 million.
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Case Questions:
As controller, you have two decisions to make. Recall that currently projected 2013
earnings of $80 million are $1 million below the consensus forecast, currently projected
earnings are $2 million below the threshold for the CEO’s bonus that is paid in stock that
(can be sold at any time)[cannot be sold until 5 years after receipt], and there are potential
effects of R&D cuts on competitiveness. You must decide on the proper accounting
treatment for the lease entered into by ABC Company and the amount to cut (if any) from
the R&D budget.



Based on the information presented on the preceding pages, circle a number on the
scale below to indicate the likelihood that you would classify this lease as an
operating lease or as a capital lease.

1
2
3
Definitely classify
as an Operating Lease



4

5

6

7

8

9
10
Definitely Classify
as a Capital Lease

Based on the information presented on the preceding pages, how much money, if any,
would you be willing to cut from the remaining R&D budget of $4 million? (enter an
amount in the range $0-$4 million)
$___________________

When you have completed the two questions, please return the materials to envelope
#1 and open envelope #2.
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Questions
1) Based on information provided in this questionnaire, what was the criterion you
needed to consider in classifying a lease as a capital lease or an operating lease
(check one)?
_____ The lease term is for the major part of the estimated economic life of the leased
property.
_____ The lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the
leased property.

2) Based on information provided in this questionnaire, what was the form of
executives’ bonus payments (check one)?
_____ Executive’s bonuses and a significant portion of their salaries are paid in stock
that can be sold at any time.
_____ Executive’s bonuses and a significant portion of their salaries are paid in stock
that cannot be sold until 5 years after receipt.

3) Based on information provided in this questionnaire, what does research say about
your future self (check one)?
_____ Recent research suggests that adulthood is characterized by stability in identity,
and the important characteristics that make you the person you are right now are
established early in life and are fixed by the end of adolescence.
_____ Recent research suggests that adulthood is characterized by instability in identity,
and the important characteristics that make you the person you are right now are likely to
change radically throughout your life.

4) In your opinion, did ABC Company’s option to renew the equipment lease at the end
of its fixed non-cancelable term for 92% of the equipment’s fair rental value represent
a bargain renewal option? Circle the number that best represents your response
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Definitely
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5) Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: “Classifying the
equipment lease as an operating lease (rather than as a capital lease) would improve
the financial position and results of operations reflected in ABC Company’s financial
statements.”
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6) If a criterion for classifying a lease as a capital lease is if the lease term is for the
major part of the economic life of the asset, what is the minimum percentage you
would assign to the expression “for the major part?”
(Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%). ________ %

There may have been a number of factors you considered while arriving at your lease
classification decision, some of which may have influenced your decision more than
others. We would like you to consider several potential factors to help us understand
which factors, relative to others, most influenced your decision. Using the scales below,
please indicate the extent to which each of the following influenced your decision.
Relative to other factors, how much was your lease classification decision influenced by
your desire to:

7) Report the economic substance of the lease in the financial statements
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Little influence
Very strong
relative to other

influence relative

factors

to other factors

8) Avoid possible second-guessing of my decision by external watchdogs such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Little influence
Very Strong
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relative to other

influence relative

factors

to other factors

9) Avoid potential negative consequences from the CEO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Little influence

9

10
Very Strong

relative to other

influence relative

factors

to other factors

10) Present the company’s financial position and profitability as favorably as the
circumstances will allow
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Little influence
Very Strong
relative to other

influence relative

factors

to other factors

When you have completed the two questions, please return the materials to envelope
#2.
Thank you for participating.
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APPENDIX B
Research Instrument
Demographic
1) What is your gender? _____Male
2) What is your age?

_____Female

_____________

3) What is your current job title?
______________________________________________
4) How many college level business courses have you taken? ________
5) How many college level accounting courses have you taken? _______
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Screen 2
(Deliberative Prime)
1) If an object travels at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many
feet will it travel in 360 seconds?
Answer: ______________
2) Suppose a student bought a pen and a pencil for a total of $11, and that the pen
cost $10 more than the pencil. How much was the pencil?
Answer: ______________
3) If a consumer bought 30 books for $540, then on average how much did the
consumer pay per book?
Answer: ______________
4) If a baker bought nine pounds of flour at $1.50 per pound then how much did the
baker pay in total?
Answer: _______________
5) If a company bought 15 computers for $1200 each, then how much did the
company pay in total?
Answer: _______________

(Intuitive Prime)
1) When you hear the name “Barack Obama,” what do you feel? Please use one word
to describe your predominant feeling.
Answer: ___________
2) When you hear the name “George W. Bush,” what do you feel? Please use one
word to describe your predominant feeling.
Answer: ___________
3) When you hear the name “Johnny Depp,” what do you feel? Please use one word
to describe your predominant feeling.
Answer: ___________
4) When you hear the words “9/11,” what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
your predominant feeling.
Answer: ___________
5) When you hear the word “baby,” what do you feel? Please use one word to describe
your predominant feeling.
Answer: ___________
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Screen 3
Introduction
You are required to complete paperwork for your automobile insurance policy after the
lease of your new car. The insurance paperwork provides guidelines for how to classify
your lease based on the terms of your lease agreement.

Issue: Accounting for Leases
The insurance company requires that all vehicle leases to be classified as either capital
leases or operating leases. For purposes of this study, there is only one criterion that
you will need to consider in determining whether the lease should be classified as a
capital lease or as an operating lease.
Criterion for Classifying Leases


If at its inception, a lease meets the following criterion, it must be classified as a
capital lease by the lessee:
• The lease term is [equal to 75% or more][for the major part] of the estimated
economic life of the leased property.
• “Lease term” is defined as the fixed non-cancelable term of the lease plus
all periods covered by bargain renewal options.
• “Bargain renewal options” allow the lessee to renew the lease for a rental
sufficiently lower than the fair rental of the property such that exercise of
the option appears, at the inception of the lease, to be reasonably assured.



If at its inception, a lease does not meet the above criterion, it must be classified
as an operating lease.

The Effects of Lease Type


Capital leases are accounted for as if they are owned by the renter, including all
the benefits and drawbacks of ownership. The policy amount will be based on the
asset value of the vehicle.



Operating leases are treated as a traditional lease. The policy amount will be
based on the value of lease payments.
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Equipment Lease Decision
You have entered into a vehicle lease agreement for a vehicle with an estimated
economic life of 6 years. The lease has a fixed non-cancelable term of 3 years, with a
lease payment of $395 payable at the beginning of each month.
At the end of the initial non-cancelable term, the lease agreement provides you with the
option to renew the lease for an additional 18 month period with the monthly rental
payment to be set at 90% of the fair rental value for the equipment at that time.
If classified as a capital lease, the insurance company will treat the vehicle as if you own
the vehicle with a value of $28,440 at the inception of the lease.
If classified as an operating lease, the insurance company will base the policy on your
lease payments of $21,330.
The annual premium for an insurance policy at your insurance company is approximately
3.5% of the vehicle’s value. Thus, a capital lease will result in a premium of $995 and
an operating lease will result in a premium of $746.
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Screen 4
Case Questions:
You have a decision to make regarding how to classify your vehicle lease for insurance
purposes.

Based on the information presented on the preceding pages, circle a number on the scale
below to indicate the likelihood that you would classify this lease as an operating lease or
as a capital lease.
1
2
3
Definitely classify
as an Operating Lease

4

5

6
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7

8

9
10
Definitely Classify
as a Capital Lease

Screen 5
Debriefing Questions:
1) Based on information provided in this questionnaire, what was the criterion you
needed to consider in classifying a lease as a capital lease or an operating lease
(check one)?
_____ The lease term is for the major part of the estimated economic life of the leased
property.
_____ The lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the
leased property.

2) Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: “Classifying the
equipment lease as an operating lease (rather than as a capital lease) would improve
my financial position.”
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

3) If a criterion for classifying a lease as a capital lease is if the lease term is for the
major part of the economic life of the asset, what is the minimum percentage you
would assign to the expression “for the major part?”
(Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%). ________ %

4) Indicate the extent to which you felt evaluators would focus on your decision
process while making your classification decision.
1
2
Did Not Feel

3

4

5

6
7
Strongly Felt

Like Evaluators Would
Focus On My Process

Like Evaluators Would
Focus On My Process
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5) Indicate the extent to which you felt evaluators would focus on your decision
outcome while making your classification decision.
1
2
Did Not Feel

3

4

5

6
7
Strongly Felt

Like Evaluators Would
Focus On My Outcome

Like Evaluators Would
Focus On My Outcome
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Screen 6
REI Index
Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1) I trust my initial feelings about people.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree

6
Strongly
Agree

2) I believe in trusting my hunches.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree

6
Strongly
Agree

3) My initial impressions of people are almost always right.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree

4) When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut feelings."
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree

5) I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can't explain how I know.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
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Screen 7
Kahneman Puzzles

1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?
_____ cents

2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?
_____ minutes

3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to
cover half of the lake?
_____ days
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APPENDIX C
Research Instrument
General Instructions
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of the study is to
examine the judgments accountants make about accounting rules. As you are aware, proper
application of accounting rules is important for reliable financial reporting. Your
participation should take approximately 15 minutes.
It is important that you work independently. Furthermore, since there may be others
from your industry in this study at a later date please do not talk with your colleagues about
the study after your participation. If you have any questions, please contact the lead
researcher at <kdugas@bentley.edu>. Your participation in this study is voluntary and
sincerely appreciated and by participating you consent to be included in the study.
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Please answer the following questions about you

1) What is your gender?

_____Male

_____Female

2) How many accounting course have you completed?
_____________________________
3) How many audit courses have you completed?
_________________________________
4) Have you completed an audit internship?
_____________________________________
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The following pages contain background information and relevant accounting
guidance necessary to make your audit decision.
Background Information
Assume that you are the auditor of ABC Company. Your audit supervisor has assigned
you to audit the classification of leases. ABC Company has entered into several leases for
the year under audit.

Relevant Guidance: Accounting for Leases
Applicable accounting standards require leases to be classified and accounted for as
either capital leases or operating leases. For purposes of this study, there is only one
criterion that you will need to consider in determining whether a lease should be
classified as a capital lease or as an operating lease.
Criterion for Classifying Leases


If at its inception, a lease meets the following criterion, it must be classified as a
capital lease by the lessee:
• The lease term is (equal to 75% or more)[for the major part] of the estimated
economic life of the leased property.
• “Lease term” is defined as the fixed non-cancelable term of the lease plus
all periods covered by bargain renewal options.
• “Bargain renewal options” allow the lessee to renew the lease for a rental
sufficiently lower than the fair rental of the property such that exercise of the
option appears, at the inception of the lease, to be reasonably assured.



If at its inception, a lease does not meet the above criterion, it must be classified
as an operating lease.

The Financial Statement Effects of Leases


Capital leases are accounted for by recording an asset and a liability on the
balance sheet at the present value of the minimum lease payments. Lease
payments are allocated between a reduction of the lease liability and interest
expense. In addition, depreciation expense related to the leased asset is
recognized over the lease term.



Operating leases are accounted for as rental expense on the income statement.
No asset or liability is recorded on the balance sheet.
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Lease Decision: Delta Equipment Lease
ABC Company has entered into a lease for new equipment that has an estimated
economic life of 10 years. The lease has a fixed non-cancelable term of 5 years, with a
rental of $250,000 payable at the beginning of each month.
At the end of the initial non-cancelable term, the lease agreement provides ABC
Company with the option to renew the lease for an additional 3-year period with the
monthly rental payment to be set at 92% of the fair rental value for the equipment at
that time.
(ABC Company has classified the lease as a capital lease.)
[ABC Company has classified the lease as an operating lease.]
{Classification statement omitted}
If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be a capital lease, ABC
Company should have recognized an asset and a liability in the amount of $12,852,958
at the inception of the lease. In 2015, interest expense and depreciation expense
totaling $3,739,343 will be recognized.
If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be an operating lease, ABC
Company should have recognized rental expense of $3,000,000 in 2015 and no asset or
liability.
Thus, determining that the appropriate classification of the lease is a capital lease will
increase 2015 liabilities by $12,852,958 and increase 2015 expenses and decrease
2015 net income by $739,343 relative to ABC Company’s financial position if the
appropriate classification of the lease is an operating lease.

Delta Equipment Lease Classification Assessment
Based on the information presented above, circle a number on the scale below to indicate
your perception of the appropriate classification of this lease as an operating lease or as a
capital lease.
1
2
3
Definitely classify
as an Operating Lease

4

5

6
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7

8

9
10
Definitely Classify
as a Capital Lease
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Lease Decision: Gamma Equipment Lease
ABC Company has entered into a lease for new equipment that has an estimated
economic life of 7 years. The lease has a fixed non-cancelable term of 4 years, with
$300,000 payable at the beginning of each month.
At the end of the initial non-cancelable term, the lease agreement provides ABC
Company with the option to renew the lease for an additional 1-year period with the
monthly rental payment to be set at 92% of the fair rental value for the equipment at
that time.
(ABC Company has classified the lease as a capital lease.)
[ABC Company has classified the lease as an operating lease.]
{Classification statement omitted}
If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be a capital lease, the
Company will recognize an asset and a liability in the amount of $12,711,961 at the
inception of the lease. In 2015, interest expense and depreciation expense totaling
$4,312,720 will be recognized.
If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be an operating lease, the
Company will recognize rental expense of $3,600,000 in 2015 and no asset or liability.
Thus, determining that the appropriate classification of the lease is a capital lease will
increase liabilities by $12,711,961 and increase 2015 expenses and decrease 2015 net
income by $712,720 relative to ABC Company’s financial position if the appropriate
classification of the lease is an operating lease.

Gamma Equipment Lease Classification Assessment
Based on the information presented above, circle a number on the scale below to indicate
your perception of the appropriate classification of this lease as an operating lease or as a
capital lease.
1
2
3
Definitely classify
as an Operating Lease

4

5

6
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7

8

9
10
Definitely Classify
as a Capital Lease

Lease Decision: Sigma Equipment Lease
ABC Company has entered into a lease for new equipment that has an estimated
economic life of 10 years. The lease has a fixed non-cancelable term of 6 years, with a
rental of $200,000 payable at the beginning of each month.
At the end of the initial non-cancelable term, the lease agreement provides ABC
Company with the option to renew the lease for an additional 2-year period with the
monthly rental payment to be set at 92% of the fair rental value for the equipment at
that time.
(ABC Company has classified the lease as a capital lease.)
[ABC Company has classified the lease as an operating lease.]
{Classification statement omitted}

If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be a capital lease, ABC
Company should have recognized an asset and a liability in the amount of $11,982,395
at the inception of the lease. In 2015, interest expense and depreciation expense
totaling $3,100,772 will be recognized.
If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be an operating lease, ABC
Company should have recognized rental expense of $2,400,000 in 2015 and no asset or
liability.
Thus, determining that the appropriate classification of the lease is a capital lease will
increase liabilities by $11,982,395 and increase 2015 expenses and decrease 2015 net
income by $700,772 relative to ABC Company’s financial position if the appropriate
classification of the lease is an operating lease.

Sigma Equipment Lease Classification Assessment
Based on the information presented above, circle a number on the scale below to indicate
your perception of the appropriate classification of this lease as an operating lease or as a
capital lease.
1
2
Definitely classify

3

4

5

6
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7

8

9
10
Definitely Classify

as an Operating Lease

as a Capital Lease
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Lease Decision: Phi Equipment Lease
ABC Company has entered into a lease for new equipment that has an estimated
economic life of 15 years. The lease has a fixed non-cancelable term of 9 years, with a
rental of $150,000 payable at the beginning of each month.
At the end of the initial non-cancelable term, the lease agreement provides ABC
Company with the option to renew the lease for an additional 2-year period with the
monthly rental payment to be set at 92% of the fair rental value for the equipment at
that time.
(ABC Company has classified the lease as a capital lease.)
[ABC Company has classified the lease as an operating lease.]
{Classification statement omitted}
If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be a capital lease, ABC
Company should have recognized an asset and a liability in the amount of $12,366,283
at the inception of the lease. In 2015, interest expense and depreciation expense
totaling $2,542,953 will be recognized.
If the appropriate classification of the lease is determined to be an operating lease, ABC
Company should have recognized rental expense of $1,800,000 in 2015 and no asset or
liability.
Thus, determining that the appropriate classification of the lease is a capital lease will
increase liabilities by $12,366,283 and increase 2015 expenses and decrease 2015 net
income by $742,953 relative to ABC Company’s financial position if the appropriate
classification of the lease is an operating lease.

Phi Equipment Lease Classification Assessment
Based on the information presented above, circle a number on the scale below to indicate
your perception of the appropriate classification of this lease as an operating lease or as a
capital lease.
1
2
3
Definitely classify
as an Operating Lease

4

5

6
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7

8

9
10
Definitely Classify
as a Capital Lease

Questions
1) Based on information provided in this questionnaire, what was the criterion you
needed to consider in classifying a lease as a capital lease or an operating
lease (check one)?
_____ The lease term is for the major part of the estimated economic life of the
leased property.
_____ The lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the
leased property.

2) Were you provided with management’s classification of the leases?
_____ Yes, I was provided with management’s classification of the leases.
_____ No, I was not provided with management’s classification of the leases.

3) In your opinion, did ABC Company’s option to renew the equipment lease at the
end of its fixed non-cancelable term for 92% of the equipment’s fair rental value
represent a bargain renewal option? Circle the number that best represents your
response
1
2
Not at all

3

4

5

6

7
Definitely

4) Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: “Classifying
the equipment lease as an operating lease (rather than as a capital lease) would
improve the financial position and results of operations reflected in ABC Company’s
financial statements.”
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6
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7
Strongly
Agree

5) Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: “ABC
Company has an incentive to improve the financial position and results of
operations reflected in ABC Company’s financial statements.”
1
2
3
Strongly
Disagree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6) Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: “ABC
Company’s own classification of the lease provides valuable information to the
auditor”
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

7) Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: “I have
discretion in deciding how much to weight various facts in reaching a decision”
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

8) Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: “An auditor
will have to defend his/her application of this accounting standard to others.”
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

9) If a criterion for classifying a lease as a capital lease is if the lease term is for the
major part of the economic life of the asset, what is the minimum percentage you
would assign to the expression “for the major part?”

(Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%). ________ %
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10) Please indicate the system of financial accounting standards with which you are
most familiar
______ U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
______ International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
______ Local Reporting Standards
Please identify which standard system: __________________
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